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Involuntary medical treatment—treatment that is administered at the 
direction of the government, over the objection of the patient—potentially 
compromises several individual constitutional interests.  By definition, 
involuntary medical treatment burdens the individual’s interest in 
making an autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment, an interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause.1  Involuntary medical treatment 
that is administered for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime 
additionally threatens the individual’s interest in avoiding unreasonable 
governmental intrusions upon his privacy and personal security, an 
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.2 
Like all individual constitutional rights, rights under both the Due 
Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment can be outweighed by sufficiently 
important government interests.3  To determine whether involuntary 
medical treatment violates the Due Process Clause, courts ask whether 
the government’s interest that the treatment advances is important 
enough to justify compromising the individual’s interest in making an 
autonomous decision to refuse medical treatment.4  Involuntary treatment 
must also be medically appropriate, but any physical harms that the 
treatment might cause are not balanced directly against the government’s 
interest.  For example, if the government sought to administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of rendering a 
criminal defendant competent to stand trial, a court would ask whether 
the medications were medically appropriate, but would not ask whether 
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  Other interests potentially compromised by
involuntary medical treatment include the First Amendment right to religious freedom 
and the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.  These 
additional interests are beyond the scope of this Article. 
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The
Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 90 (1989) (“Because no constitutional 
rights are absolute, virtually every constitutional case involves the question whether the 
government’s action is justified by a sufficient purpose.”).  One scholar has suggested 
that “[t]he only truly absolute right may be the First Amendment freedom to believe.” 
Edward J. Imwinkelried, Can We Rely on the Alleged Constitutional Right to 
Informational Privacy to Secure Genetic Privacy in the Courtroom?, 31 SETON HALL L.
REV. 926, 928 (2001). 
4. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982) (“In determining whether
a substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary 
to balance ‘the liberty of the individual’ and ‘the demands of an organized society.’” 
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))). 
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the government’s interest in bringing the defendant to trial justified the 
potential harms of the medications.5  Involuntary antipsychotic medications 
would be prohibited if the harmfulness made the treatment medically 
inappropriate. 
To determine whether involuntary medical treatment violates the 
Fourth Amendment, courts ask whether the government’s interest that 
the treatment advances is important enough to justify compromising the 
individual’s interest in protecting his privacy and physical security.6 
Any physical harms that the treatment might cause are balanced directly 
against the government’s interest.  For example, if the government 
sought to compel a criminal defendant to undergo surgery to remove a 
bullet from his body for the purpose of proving that he had committed a 
crime, a court would ask whether the government’s interest in obtaining 
the bullet justified the potential harms of the surgery.7  Involuntary 
surgery would be unreasonable, and therefore prohibited, if the government’s 
interest did not justify the harmfulness. 
5. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003).  The Sell test is
presented infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
6. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (“The test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment . . . requires a balancing of the need for the particular 
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.”).  In many Fourth 
Amendment cases, a warrant issued upon probable cause, or probable cause and exigent 
circumstances that excuse the failure to obtain a warrant, establishes a sufficiently 
important government interest to justify a search or seizure.  See William J. Stuntz, O.J. 
Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
842, 847 (2001) (“Whether the police suspect a house shelters a murder weapon or a 
stash of marijuana, the standard is the same: the police cannot search unless they have 
probable cause to believe evidence of crime will be found, plus either a warrant or the 
ability to show that getting one was not feasible.”).  In these cases, courts consider that 
the “Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need” 
through the warrant and probable cause requirements.  Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 
U.S. 547, 559 (1978).  In other Fourth Amendment cases, though, probable cause is not 
sufficient to justify a search or seizure.  For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that 
“[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates 
expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be 
‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”  Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 
753, 759 (1985).  Involuntary medical treatment cases are thus a special kind of Fourth 
Amendment case, in which the existence of probable cause does not necessarily mean 
that a search is reasonable.  Some scholars have referred to these cases as involving 
“hyper-intrusive” searches.  See Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother? 
The Need for Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 547, 548 (2003) (proposing category); Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Coerced 
Confessions and the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 57, 108 (2002) 
(adopting category). 
7. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 760–62.
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This Article contends that when the government seeks to administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications to an incompetent8 criminal 
defendant, the Due Process Clause analysis—which asks whether 
involuntary medical treatment is medically appropriate, not whether it is 
reasonable—inadequately protects the defendant’s interest in being free 
from physical harms that are not justified by the government’s interest in 
rendering him competent to stand trial.  Courts routinely decide that 
administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent 
criminal defendants is medically appropriate, but arguably the question 
that courts should be deciding is whether administering involuntary 
antipsychotic medications is reasonable—that is, whether the government’s 
interest in bringing the defendant to trial is important enough to justify 
the harms of involuntary antipsychotic medications. 
Consider, for example, the case of Herbert Evans.  Evans has a long 
history of paranoid schizophrenia.9  In 2002, when he was seventy-four 
years old, Evans was charged with several federal offenses, but because 
of his paranoid delusions, he was found incompetent to stand trial.10  
Evans refused to take voluntarily the antipsychotic medications that 
might have alleviated his delusions and rendered him competent to stand 
trial.11  The government then sought an order allowing the antipsychotic 
medications to be administered involuntarily.12 
In support of its decision granting the government’s request to 
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to Evans, the district 
court wrote a brief opinion stating that “the government has shown 
sufficient proof” of all of the findings required for an order allowing 
involuntary medications, including a finding “that such medicine is 
medically appropriate.”13  The Fourth Circuit reversed, in part because 
the district court was “without adequate information” to conclude that 
antipsychotic medications were medically appropriate for Evans, “an 
elderly man with diabetes, hypertension, and asthma who takes a number 
of medications to treat these conditions.”14  The Fourth Circuit then set 
 
 8. “Incompetent” as used in the Article means “incompetent to stand trial,” unless 
otherwise specified.  The criteria for competence to stand trial are discussed infra note 
108. 
 9. United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Evans’s delusions 
of governmental conspiracies . . . have persisted longer than 40 years . . . .”); United 
States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 671 (W.D. Va. 2003) (referring to Evans’s “long 
history of treatment for psychiatric problems” and “paranoid schizophrenia of a long-
standing nature”). 
 10. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d. at 670. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *2 (W.D. Va. 
Mar. 18, 2004). 
 14. Evans, 404 F.3d at 240–41. 
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out a long list of requirements that the government must satisfy to 
support a finding of medical appropriateness, including the requirement 
of a detailed treatment plan specifying particular medications, dosages, 
and likely side effects.15 
On remand, the district court found that the government’s evidence 
satisfied most of the Fourth Circuit’s requirements.16  The district court 
ruled, though, that the government had not submitted a sufficiently 
detailed plan for responding to the possibility that antipsychotic 
medications would exacerbate Evans’s diabetes.17  The court therefore 
authorized the government to implement its involuntary antipsychotic 
medication treatment plan, but only until Evans’s diabetes becomes 
insulin-dependent: “I will direct that, in the event that Evans’[s] diabetes 
worsens to the point of requiring daily insulin shots, the government 
must cease treatment with the antipsychotic currently in use and return 
to this court with a new proposal.”18  The Fourth Circuit issued a per 
curiam opinion summarily affirming the district court’s order permitting 
the government to administer involuntary antipsychotic medications.19 
That the district court is prepared to allow the government to continue 
administering involuntary antipsychotic medications to Evans until he 
requires daily injections of insulin, even though the court has not 
explained why the charges against Evans justify this level of harm,20 
15. Id. at 240–42.  The court ruled that “[t]he government must propose a course
of treatment in which it specifies the particular drug to be administered,” and must 
“explain how it reached its conclusions” regarding medical appropriateness “with respect 
to Evans as an individual.”  Id. at 240.  Further, the government “must set forth the 
particular medication, including the dose range, it proposes to administer to Evans to 
restore his competency” and “must also relate the proposed treatment plan to the 
individual defendant’s particular medical condition.”  Id. at 242.  Finally, the 
government 
must spell out why it proposed the particular course of treatment, provide the 
estimated time the proposed treatment plan will take to restore the defendant’s 
competence and the criteria it will apply when deciding when to discontinue 
the treatment, describe the plan’s probable benefits and side effect risks for the 
defendant’s particular medical condition, show how it will deal with the plan’s 
probable side effects, and explain why, in its view, the benefits of the treatment 
plan outweigh the costs of its side effects. 
Id. at 242 (footnote and citations omitted). 
16. United States v. Evans, 427 F. Supp. 2d 696, 705 (W.D. Va. 2006).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 706.
19. United States v. Evans, 199 F. App’x 290, 290 (4th Cir. 2006).
20. The district court based its conclusion that the government has an “important”
interest in bringing Evans to trial on the fact that Evans “is charged with a felony for 
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captures the inadequacy of the due process test for deciding when to 
allow the government to administer involuntary medical treatment for 
the purpose of  rendering a defendant competent to stand trial.  As cases 
like Evans demonstrate, “medically appropriate” is an inadequate standard 
for protecting an incompetent defendant’s interest in avoiding harms 
from involuntary antipsychotic medications that are not justified by the 
government’s interest in bringing him to trial. 
Part I of this Article discusses the legal protections against involuntary 
medical treatment.  In the typical right to refuse treatment case, a patient’s 
interests are divided—the patient’s interest in autonomous decisionmaking 
about his health requires that he be allowed to refuse medical treatment, 
but the patient’s interest in preserving his health, and perhaps even his 
life, requires that he be administered involuntary treatment.  Generally, 
when a patient chooses to refuse treatment at the expense of his own life 
or health, courts have ruled that the government’s interest in preserving 
the patient’s life or health is insufficient to justify involuntary treatment.21  
In a small subset of right to refuse treatment cases, however, the government 
seeks to administer involuntary treatment for some purpose other than 
preserving the patient’s life or health.  Part II examines such cases, 
including several Supreme Court cases decided under the Due Process 
Clause and several decided under the Fourth Amendment.  As Part III 
explains, in following the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Due Process 
Clause cases, trial courts have permitted the government to administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications that risk causing, and in some 
cases have caused, harms that are at least as severe as harms that in the 
 
which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years.”  United States v. Evans, No. 
102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *2 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2004).  The Fourth Circuit 
agreed: “We think it beyond dispute that the Government does have an important interest 
in trying a defendant charged with a felony carrying a maximum punishment of 10 years 
imprisonment.”  United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 238 (4th Cir. 2005).  The 
complexities of measuring the importance of the government’s interest in bringing a 
defendant to trial are discussed infra notes 195–217 and accompanying text. 
 21. See John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for 
Unwilling Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 881 (2006) (“Courts today are usually 
vigilant to protect the right of competent adults to refuse medical treatment, even 
lifesaving procedures.”); Andrea Marsh, Testing Pregnant Women and Newborns for 
HIV: Legal and Ethical Responses to Public Health Efforts to Prevent Pediatric AIDS, 
13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 195, 247 (2001) (noting that “the Court has reaffirmed the 
competent adult’s right to refuse life-preserving medical treatment, indicating that the 
state’s interest in preserving life does not trump individual autonomy so long as the 
individual’s wishes regarding treatment can be determined to a sufficient degree of 
certainty” (footnote omitted)); Melvin I. Urofsky, Do Go Gentle into That Good Night: 
Thoughts on Death, Suicide, Morality and the Law, 59 ARK. L. REV. 819, 824 (2007) 
(“In the 1970s and 1980s, state courts reaffirmed the notion that a competent person, 
voluntarily making a knowledgeable decision, had the legal right to refuse or terminate 
treatment.”). 
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Fourth Amendment cases prompted the Supreme Court to rule that 
involuntary medical treatment was not justified.  Part IV analyzes the 
government’s interest in rendering criminal defendants competent to 
stand trial, proposing that a Fourth Amendment-like balancing test—
instead of the current due process medical appropriateness test—would 
better ensure that courts decide to allow involuntary antipsychotic medications 
only when the government’s interest in rendering a criminal defendant 
competent to stand trial is important enough to justify the harms.  The 
Article concludes that under the current due process test, incompetent 
criminal defendants are being subjected to harms that might not be 
justified by the government’s interest in bringing them to trial. 
I.  LEGAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST INVOLUNTARY MEDICAL TREATMENT 
Historically, the primary legal source of protection for an individual’s 
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was tort law, in particular the 
law of battery.22  Not until late in the twentieth century did courts 
recognize a constitutionally protected interest in refusing medical 
treatment.23  One of the first cases to recognize this constitutional protection 
was In re Quinlan, decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976.24  
Twenty-one-year-old Karen Quinlan had been in a persistent vegetative 
state for several months, breathing by means of a respirator with little 
hope of recovery or improvement, when her family decided that she 
 
 22. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990); see also 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (“The constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition that was discussed in Cruzan was . . . 
grounded in the Nation’s history and traditions, given the common-law rule that forced 
medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse 
unwanted medical treatment.” (citation omitted)); I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and 
the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1155–56 (2008) (“The belief that an 
individual is sovereign over his body . . . stands behind a number of familiar legal 
doctrines like the right to be free from battery, the right to give informed consent, and the 
right to refuse medical treatment.” (footnote omitted)). 
 23. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723 (noting that in Cruzan, the Court “assumed 
that the Constitution granted competent persons a ‘constitutionally protected right to 
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.’” (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 279)); Vacco v. 
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997) (“Everyone, regardless of physical condition, is entitled, 
if competent, to refuse unwanted life saving treatment . . . .”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
 24. See Kristen M. Dama, Redefining a Final Act: The Fourteenth Amendment and 
States’ Obligation to Prevent Death Row Inmates from Volunteering to Be Put to Death, 
9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1083, 1099 (2007) (“In 1976, in In re Quinlan, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court established a right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment; this was one of 
the first, and most direct, affirmations of this right.” (footnote omitted)). 
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would not have wanted to be kept alive under such circumstances.25  
When Quinlan’s physician refused to disconnect her from the respirator, 
her father petitioned the court for the right to do so.26  The state of New 
Jersey argued that its interests in the preservation of life and in the 
independent functioning of the medical profession justified continued 
treatment.27  The court ruled that if her family, her doctor, and the 
hospital ethics committee all agreed that she had no reasonable chance 
of recovery, Quinlan’s life-sustaining treatment could be terminated.28  
Although the court did reference the “very great” invasiveness of 
Quinlan’s treatment—“24 hour intensive nursing care, antibiotics, the 
assistance of a respirator, a catheter and feeding tube”29—the court did 
not base its ruling on any physical harms that Quinlan might have 
experienced because of continued treatment.30  Instead, the court decided 
that continued treatment would harm Quinlan’s autonomy and privacy 
interests.31  Quinlan had a constitutional right to refuse medical 
treatment, but because of her medical condition, she could not assert that 
right herself.32  Allowing someone else to refuse medical treatment for 
her would “vindicate” her right of privacy,33 even though it would also 
cause her physical harm.34 
 
 25. 348 A.2d 801, 814 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (“Karen Quinlan is quoted 
as saying she never wanted to be kept alive by extraordinary means.  The statements 
attributed to her by her mother, sister and a friend are indicated to have been made 
essentially in relation to instances where close friends or relatives were terminally ill.”), 
modified and remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). 
 26. Id. 
 27. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651–52, 663 (N.J. 1976). 
 28. Id. at 671–72. 
 29. Id. at 664. 
 30. Id. at 662–64.  The parties disputed whether Quinlan was capable of 
experiencing pain.  See ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF 
LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 147–48 (1979).  Not disputed, though, was the fact 
that discontinuing treatment would likely hasten Quinlan’s death.  In re Quinlan, 355 
A.2d at 655. 
 31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (“The Court in Griswold found the unwritten 
constitutional right of privacy to exist in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights . . . .  Presumably this right is broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision 
to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 32. Id. (“[I]f Karen were herself miraculously lucid for an interval (not altering the 
existing prognosis of the condition to which she would soon return) and perceptive of her 
irreversible condition, she could effectively decide upon discontinuance of the life-
support apparatus, even if it meant the prospect of natural death.”). 
 33. Id. at 664 (“[Karen’s] right of privacy in respect of the matter before the Court 
is to be vindicated by Mr. Quinlan as guardian, as hereinabove determined.”); see also 
id. (“The only practical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian 
and family of Karen to render their best judgment, subject to the qualifications 
hereinafter stated, as to whether she would exercise it in these circumstances.”). 
 34. Or more precisely, discontinuing medical treatment would allow Quinlan’s 
illness to cause her physical harm.  See supra note 30. 
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The United States Supreme Court, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Department of Health, similarly acknowledged a constitutionally 
protected interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment.35  Like Karen 
Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegetative state kept alive by 
a feeding tube when her parents decided that she would not have wanted 
to continue receiving such treatment—treatment that would prolong her 
life but would not offer any real hope of recovery.36  As in Quinlan, the 
Court in Cruzan found that unwanted medical treatment would harm 
Cruzan not physically but psychically; or as Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion explained, such unwanted treatment “burdens the patient’s liberty, 
dignity, and freedom to determine the course of her own treatment.”37  
Even though Cruzan’s autonomy interest in refusing treatment could not 
be exercised on her behalf without harming her physical health, the 
Court ruled that the government’s interest in preserving Cruzan’s health 
could not justify continued treatment that she would not want.38 
Most right to refuse treatment cases are like Quinlan and Cruzan—
cases in which an individual’s interest in making an autonomous choice 
to refuse medical treatment is at odds with the government’s interest in 
preserving the individual’s life or health.  In such cases, courts routinely 
rule that the government’s interest does not justify abridging the individual’s 
interest.39  What, though, of cases in which the government’s purpose for 
seeking to administer involuntary medical treatment is not to preserve a 
 
 35. 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The principle that a competent person has a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be 
inferred from our prior decisions.”); see also id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical 
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the 
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
 36. Id. at 266–68. 
 37. Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. at 280. 
 39. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); Brophy 
v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 638 (Mass. 1986); see also Norman 
L. Cantor, Twenty-Five Years After Quinlan: A Review of the Jurisprudence of Death 
and Dying, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 182, 183–84 (2001) (“The cases acknowledge a 
legitimate governmental interest in promoting sanctity of human life, but they also tend 
to find that a patient’s liberty interests (self-determination and bodily integrity) simply 
outweigh the state’s abstract interest in sanctity of life.”); Jaime Staples King & 
Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical 
Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 468 (2006) (noting “the primacy in the law 
of an individual’s autonomy over her health and the ability of a competent individual to 
make medical decisions that may not be in her best medical interest”). 
UNREASONABLE_FINAL_DRAFT 5/15/2009  4:42:45 PM 
 
10 
patient’s life or health?  What kind of government interest can justify 
involuntary medical treatment that not only compromises autonomous 
decisionmaking but also causes physical harms? 
II.  JUSTIFICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
In cases like Quinlan and Cruzan, the government’s interest that 
involuntary treatment promotes is the life or health of the person who is 
refusing treatment.40  Occasionally, though, the government seeks to 
administer involuntary treatment not to preserve the treatment-refusing 
person’s life or health but to achieve some other interest, such as protecting 
the public from a smallpox epidemic, combating drunk driving, or 
obtaining evidence of a crime.41  In these cases, it has come to matter 
whether the government’s actions are recognized as a search or seizure 
that implicates the Fourth Amendment or are instead characterized only 
as an interference with autonomous decisionmaking that implicates the 
Due Process Clause.  Under the Fourth Amendment, involuntary treatment 
must be reasonable, given the weight of the government’s interest that 
the involuntary treatment advances.  But under the Due Process Clause 
generally, and in particular under the test recently set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, courts ask not whether involuntary 
treatment is reasonable but rather whether it is medically appropriate.42 
The path that led to Sell and the medical appropriateness standard 
began with Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the first Supreme Court case to 
rule on the constitutionality of administering involuntary medical 
treatment for police power purposes.43  Between Jacobson and Sell, the 
Court developed a due process jurisprudence that defines autonomous 
decisionmaking as the individual constitutional interest that is infringed 
by unjustified involuntary medical treatment.  As a result, the Due Process 
Clause permits government actions that interfere with autonomous 
decisionmaking if those actions promote government interests that are 
important enough to justify such interference. 
A.  Police Powers and Autonomous Decisionmaking 
The Supreme Court first considered the possibility that compelling 
 
 40. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d. 647, 651–52 (N.J. 1976); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280. 
 41. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763–66 (1985) (evidence of a crime); 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–72 (1966) (drunk driving and evidence of a 
crime); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–28 (1905) (smallpox). 
 42. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 177, 181 (2003); see also Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990). 
 43. 197 U.S. 11, 14–15 (1905). 
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people to submit to unwanted medical procedures might be a valid 
exercise of the government’s police powers in Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts.44  Henry Jacobson objected that a Massachusetts law 
requiring him to be vaccinated against smallpox was an invasion of his 
“liberty,” was “unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive,” and was “an 
assault upon his person.”45  The Court rejected Jacobson’s arguments, 
ruling that when faced with an impending smallpox epidemic, the state 
of Massachusetts was justified in compelling its residents, including 
Jacobson, to be vaccinated.46  The Court seemed to view Jacobson as 
something of a free-rider—someone who wanted to enjoy the benefits of 
a safe, healthy community but who was not willing to accept the 
responsibility of following the community’s health and safety regulations: 
“We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in 
any city or town where smallpox is prevalent . . . may thus defy the will 
of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the 
legislative sanction of the State.”47 
Although the Court upheld Massachusetts’s law and its application to 
Jacobson, it also suggested that there are limits not only on the 
individual’s right to refuse to be vaccinated but also on the government’s 
right to compel such treatment.48  The Jacobson Court thus did not endorse 
compulsory vaccinations, even if justified by an impending epidemic, 
irrespective of the amount of physical harm the vaccination would cause.  
Instead, the Court imposed an upper limit on the amount of harm that the 
government could cause, writing that if “a particular condition of [a 
person’s] health or body” would make vaccination “cruel and inhuman 
in the last degree,” a court should intervene to “protect the health and 
life of the individual concerned.”49 
When Jacobson was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet defined 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 26. 
 46. Id. at 38–39. 
 47. Id. at 37. 
 48. Id. at 38–39. 
 49. Id.  Jacobson is in one sense about the individual’s right to refuse medical 
treatment but it is also in another sense about the government’s options when confronted 
with an emergency.  In emergency situations, the government is justified in using 
appropriate force even if it causes serious physical harm.  See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 
475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (allowing use of deadly force to end a prison riot); Tennessee 
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (allowing use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing 
felon if “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of 
serious physical harm”). 
UNREASONABLE_FINAL_DRAFT 5/15/2009  4:42:45 PM 
 
12 
substantive due process in terms of personal autonomy.50  Then, the 
substantive liberty that the Due Process Clause protected was primarily 
economic.51  But the Supreme Court’s current substantive due process 
jurisprudence protects not so much individual economic liberty as individual 
“privacy,” “dignity,” and “autonomy.”52  In its modern substantive due 
process cases, the Court has identified the individual liberty interest that 
is at stake as the interest in making autonomous decisions.53  The 
government satisfies its due process obligations by not interfering in 
individual decisions and violates due process by imposing an “undue 
burden” on individual decisions.54  A due process injury either occurs or 
 
 50. See B. Jessie Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment 
Decisions: A Tale of Two Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 296 n.82 (2007) (“Jacobson 
was a Lochner-era case.  The doctrine of substantive due process was of course liberally 
applied in the Lochner era but largely to strike down laws on the grounds that they 
interfered with economic rights, not fundamental personal rights.”). 
 51. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 742 (1989) 
(“From the late 1870’s to the turn of the century, the Court formulated an interpretation 
of due process in which the predominant figure was a fundamental, potentially inviolate 
‘liberty of contract’ with which legislatures had no power to interfere.”). 
 52. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (ruling that the “right to 
liberty under the Due Process Clause” encompasses “the personal and private life of the 
individual”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
772 (1986) (protecting right to make decision that is “basic to individual dignity and 
autonomy”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (recognizing a “right of privacy” 
that is “founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty”); Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (referring to the “zone of privacy created by 
several fundamental constitutional guarantees”). 
 53. Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Doe v. Bolton, a companion case to 
Roe v. Wade, identifies three categories of decisions that the Due Process Clause 
protects: 
First is the autonomous control over the development and expression of one’s 
intellect, interests, tastes, and personality. . . .  Second is freedom of choice in 
the basic decisions of one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, 
contraception, and the education and upbringing of children. . . .  Third is the 
freedom to care for one’s health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or 
compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf. 
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211–13 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).  In Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court made this understanding 
of due process clear: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 54. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874–79 (developing “undue burden” test); see also 
Radhika Rao, Reconceiving Privacy: Relationships and Reproductive Technology, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1077, 1079 (1998) (stating that “privacy is the quintessential negative 
right—a right to be free from governmental interference”); Rubenfeld, supra note 51, at 
784 (“The principle of the right to privacy . . . is the fundamental freedom not to have 
one’s life too totally determined by a progressively more normalizing state.”).  Some 
scholars, though, have argued for a more expansive, positive-right understanding of the 
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does not occur at the moment the government prevents an individual 
from making an autonomous decision.55  A violation of due process does 
not require that the individual experience any additional harms as a 
result of the government’s interference with autonomous 
decisionmaking.56  Thus, if the government lacks sufficient justification 
for overriding an individual’s decision to refuse medical treatment, then 
the person who has been physically harmed by involuntary medical 
treatment has experienced exactly the same due process injury—
unjustified interference with the right to make autonomous decisions—
as has the person who has not been physically harmed, or who has even 
been physically benefited, by involuntary medical treatment. 
Whatever else is desirable or undesirable about this understanding of 
substantive due process, it inadequately protects an incompetent criminal 
defendant’s interest in avoiding unreasonable harms when the government 
 
right to privacy.  See, e.g., April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical 
Treatment of Pregnant Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 723, 751 (2004) (“If understood as decisional autonomy, then the notion of 
privacy expands to include an affirmative state obligation to ensure that women, 
regardless of whether they are pregnant, get to make decisions regarding health care 
autonomously, not without context, but without familial or state coercion.”); Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the 
Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1478 (1991) (“The definition of privacy as a 
purely negative right serves to exempt the state from any obligation to ensure the social 
conditions and resources necessary for self-determination and autonomous 
decisionmaking.”). 
 55. Cf. Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(“Intangible rights . . . are abridged the moment a state silences free speech or prevents a 
citizen from following the precepts of his religion.  While the violation may be 
accompanied by psychological or even physical injury, the severity of incursion is not 
necessarily measured in those terms.”). 
 56. A violation of the autonomy interest protected by the Due Process Clause 
necessarily causes not a physical harm but a kind of psychological, spiritual, 
metaphysical, or otherwise intangible, nonphysical harm—the harm of not being able to 
make an autonomous decision.  See id. (“[T]he harms proscribed by the First 
Amendment, Due Process, or Equal Protection are assaults on individual freedom and 
personal liberty, even on spiritual autonomy, and not on physical well-being.”).  Thus, 
the Due Process Clause protects against the nonphysical harms that result from 
unjustified interference with an individual’s right to autonomously decide to refuse 
medical treatment.  The Due Process Clause does not, however, necessarily protect 
against any physical harms caused by involuntary medical treatment.  This does not 
mean that violations of the Due Process Clause cannot cause physical harms.  Rather, it 
means only that a government action that has violated due process has not necessarily 
caused a physical injury.  Cf. Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781–82 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(noting that “[a] prisoner is entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First 
Amendment rights aside from any physical, mental, or emotional injury he may have 
sustained”). 
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seeks to administer involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose of 
bringing the defendant to trial.  The Supreme Court has ruled that in 
these cases, antipsychotic medications must be “medically appropriate.”57  
By explicitly requiring that involuntary medications be medically appropriate, 
the Court would seem to be suggesting that trial courts might in some 
cases refuse to authorize involuntary antipsychotic medications on the 
basis of medical inappropriateness.  But as originally conceived by the 
Supreme Court in Washington v. Harper, the medical appropriateness 
standard was not intended to serve as a check on unjustified administration 
of involuntary antipsychotic medications.58  And even though in Sell the 
Court might have intended medical appropriateness to be a check, in 
practice it has not served this purpose. 
B.  The Due Process Clause and Medical Appropriateness 
Washington v. Harper was the Supreme Court’s first involuntary 
antipsychotic medication case.59  The Court observed that Walter Harper, a 
prison inmate, “possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the 
unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”60  The Court rejected, though, 
Harper’s argument that the Due Process Clause prevented the state from 
administering involuntary medication to him unless he had been found 
incompetent to make his own medical treatment decisions.61  Much of 
the Court’s reasoning rests on Harper’s status as a prisoner62 and the 
duties of the prison administrators.63  Although the Court did acknowledge 
the potential of antipsychotic medications to cause physically harmful 
 
 57. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (requiring that “the court must 
conclude that administration of the drugs is medically appropriate” (emphasis omitted)); 
see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (“medically appropriate”); 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990) (“in the inmate’s medical interest”). 
 58. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 59. 494 U.S. 210, 215–16 (1990). 
 60. Id. at 221–22. 
 61. Id.  Generally, incompetence to make medical treatment decisions is a 
requirement of involuntary medication administered under the government’s parens 
patriae powers but not its police powers.  See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 
1980) (“[T]he sine qua non for the state’s use of its parens patriae power as justification 
for the forceful administration of mind-affecting drugs is a determination that the 
individual to whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity to decide for 
himself whether he should take the drugs.”). 
 62. E.g., Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 (“The extent of a prisoner’s right under the 
Clause to avoid the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs must be defined in 
the context of the inmate’s confinement.”). 
 63. E.g., id. at 225 (“Prison administrators have not only an interest in ensuring the 
safety of prison staffs and administrative personnel, but also the duty to take reasonable 
measures for the prisoners’ own safety.” (citation omitted)). 
UNREASONABLE_FINAL_DRAFT 5/15/2009  4:42:45 PM 
[VOL. 46:  1, 2009]  Involuntary Medications 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 15 
side effects,64 its analysis balanced Harper’s liberty interest in refusing 
unwanted medications—whether physically harmful or not—against the 
state’s interest in safely maintained prisons.65  The interest in safely 
maintained prisons prevailed.66  The Court held that “given the requirements 
of the prison environment, the Due Process Clause permits the state to 
treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic 
drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and 
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”67 
The Supreme Court did not intend for this “in the inmate’s medical 
interest” requirement to limit the government’s ability to administer 
involuntary antipsychotic medications.  Instead, the Court included this 
requirement to address concerns raised in a dissenting opinion that 
different, more rigorous procedural requirements were needed to ensure 
that prison psychiatrists would not administer involuntary antipsychotic 
medications solely for institutional convenience—that is, to control the 
behavior of prisoners rather than to treat their mental illnesses.68  The 
majority concluded, though, that such procedural protections were 
unnecessary.69  Thus, in Harper, the medical appropriateness requirement 
simply reflects the Court’s belief that prison psychiatrists can be trusted 
to prescribe only those treatments that are medically appropriate.70 
 
 64. Id. at 229–30. 
 65. Id. at 236 (finding that Washington’s policy “is an accommodation between an 
inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs and 
the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical treatment to reduce the danger that 
an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents to himself or others”). 
 66. Id. at 225 (“There are few cases in which the State’s interest in combating the 
danger posed by a person to both himself and others is greater than in a prison 
environment, which, by definition, is made up of persons with a demonstrated proclivity 
for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 67. Id. at 227. 
 68. Id. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state’s policy allows 
“forced psychotropic medication on the basis of purely institutional concerns”). 
 69. Id. at 233.  The Court explained: 
There is no indication that any institutional biases affected or altered the 
decision to medicate respondent against his will . . . .  In the absence of record 
evidence to the contrary, we are not willing to presume that members of the 
staff lack the necessary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair 
hearing in accordance with the Policy. 
Id. 
 70. Id. at 231 (“[W]e conclude that an inmate’s interests are adequately protected, 
and perhaps better served, by allowing the decision to medicate to be made by medical 
professionals rather than a judge.”); id. at 233 (“The risks associated with antipsychotic 
drugs are for the most part medical ones, best assessed by medical professionals.”).  The 
problem, though, is that while medical professionals might well be better than judges at 
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Riggins v. Nevada is the Court’s only other pre-Sell case to address the 
administration of involuntary antipsychotic medications for the purpose 
of advancing the government’s interest in criminal prosecutions.71  In 
Riggins, the Court considered David Riggins’s argument that the state 
had unjustifiably compelled him to take antipsychotic medications 
during his first-degree murder trial.72  Unlike Harper, Riggins involved a 
criminal defendant rather than a convicted prisoner,73 and the state’s 
purpose for administering involuntary antipsychotic medications had 
nothing to do with prison safety.74  Nevertheless, the Court both began 
and ended its analysis of Riggins’s claim with Harper:75 “Under Harper, 
forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is impermissible absent 
a finding of overriding justification and a determination of medical 
appropriateness.  The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least as much 
protection to persons the State detains for trial.”76 
 
assessing the medical risks of involuntary treatment, medical professionals are not better 
at deciding whether the government’s interest that the involuntary treatment advances is 
important enough to justify the medical risks.  See David L. Bazelon, Institutionalization, 
Deinstitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 897, 910 (1975) 
(“The medical disciplines can no more judge the legitimacy of state intervention into the 
lives of disturbed or disturbing individuals than a prosecutor can judge the guilt of a 
person he has accused.”). 
 71. 504 U.S. 127, 133–38 (1992). 
 72. Id. at 133. 
 73. Courts apply a highly deferential standard of scrutiny to government actions 
that infringe upon prisoners’ constitutional rights.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 
(1987) (ruling that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, 
the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests”).  
Although prisoners do not lose all constitutional rights as a result of their convictions, 
they retain only those constitutional protections that are not “incompatible with the 
objectives of incarceration.”  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); Hanna v. 
Toner, 630 F.2d 442, 444 (6th Cir. 1980) (“Prisoners do not lose all of their constitutional 
rights when they enter a penal institution.  Rather they retain all of their constitutional 
rights except for those which must be impinged upon for security or rehabilitative 
purposes.”). 
 74. In Riggins, the Court assumed that the state’s purpose for administering 
involuntary antipsychotic medications was to maintain Riggins’s competence to stand 
trial.  See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 136 (hypothesizing that the trial court “simply weighed 
the risk that the defense would be prejudiced by changes in Riggins’[s] outward 
appearance against the chance that Riggins would become incompetent if taken off 
Mellaril, and struck the balance in favor of involuntary medication”). 
 75. Id. at 133 (“Our discussion in Washington v. Harper provides useful 
background for evaluating this claim.” (citation omitted)). 
 76. Id. at 135.  Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, recognized the 
inappropriateness of relying on Harper: “This is not a case like Washington v. Harper, in 
which the purpose of the involuntary medication was to ensure that the incarcerated 
person ceased to be a physical danger to himself or others.”  Id. at 140 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).  The dissenting justices, Thomas and 
Scalia, also noted that the Court was inappropriately relying on Harper: 
This case differs from Harper because it involves a pretrial detainee and not a 
convicted prisoner.  The standards for forcibly medicating inmates well may 
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As in Harper, the Riggins Court acknowledged that antipsychotic 
medications can cause physically harmful side effects.77  These physically 
harmful side effects make involuntary medications’ interference with 
individual liberty “particularly severe.”78  But in considering whether the 
state’s interest in bringing Riggins to trial justified involuntary 
medications, there was no assessment of the physical harms that Riggins 
himself might have experienced.79  The harmfulness of antipsychotics is 
in effect already written into the Harper and Riggins due process test—a 
test that is substantially the same as the Sell test.80 
In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court set forth a four-factor test 
for determining when the government may administer involuntary 
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand 
trial.81  This test allows involuntary medications when (1) “important” 
government interests are at stake, (2) medication will “significantly 
further” those important government interests, (3) involuntary medication is 
“necessary to further” those interests, and (4) medication is “medically 
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his 
 
differ from those for persons awaiting trial.  The Court, however, does not rely 
on this distinction in departing from Harper; instead, it purports to be applying 
Harper to detainees. 
Id. at 157 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. at 133–34. 
 78. Id. at 134. 
 79. Id. at 134–35.  The Court did note that the medication might have made 
Riggins drowsy or confused, but these side effects were important not because they 
might have been physically harmful but because they might have interfered with 
Riggins’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.  See id. at 137 (“It is clearly possible that 
such side effects had an impact upon not just Riggins’ outward appearance, but also the 
content of his testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the 
proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel.”); see also id. at 142 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If the defendant takes the stand, as Riggins 
did, his demeanor can have a great bearing on his credibility and persuasiveness, and on 
the degree to which he evokes sympathy.”). 
 80. The Sell Court explicitly relied on both Harper and Riggins: 
These two cases, Harper and Riggins, indicate that the Constitution permits the 
Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill 
defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant 
competent to stand trial, but only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of 
the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary 
significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests. 
539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
 81. Id. at 180–81. 
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medical condition.”82 
Thus, under Harper, Riggins, and Sell, involuntary medications are 
permitted so long as they are justified by an “important” government 
interest, are properly tailored to advance that interest,83 and are “medically 
appropriate.”84  Under the Fourth Amendment, however, involuntary 
medical treatment must be more than medically appropriate; it must also 
not be unreasonably harmful. 
C.  The Fourth Amendment and Reasonableness 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people “to be secure in 
their persons.”85  And the Fourth Amendment guarantees, especially, the 
right of people suspected by the government of having committed a 
crime to be secure in their persons.86  Although the prototypical Fourth 
Amendment case involves a search or seizure for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence of a crime, the Supreme Court has often broadly 
described the function of the Fourth Amendment as protecting 
individuals against unjustified government intrusions upon their privacy 
and personal security.87  And administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand 
trial is a potentially unjustified intrusion by the government upon the 
 
 82. Id. (emphases omitted). 
 83. Tailoring is unlikely to serve as a check against unjustified administration of 
involuntary antipsychotic medications because antipsychotic medications are the 
intervention most likely to render a defendant with schizophrenia, or another psychotic 
disorder, competent to stand trial.  See infra note 114. 
 84. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179–82 (following Harper and Riggins). 
 85. The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 86. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 820, 820 (1994) (noting that “the Fourth Amendment structures the investigative 
process by restricting many of the most effective means of detecting law-breaking and 
apprehending law-breakers”). 
 87. E.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (“The Fourth 
Amendment imposes limits on search-and-seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary 
and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal 
security of individuals.”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (“The basic 
purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, 
is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by 
governmental officials.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The 
overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”). 
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defendant’s privacy and personal security.88  Thus, the Fourth Amendment 
cases involving involuntary medical treatment provide useful insights 
into how courts should decide whether to allow the government to 
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent criminal 
defendants. 
The two seminal cases in which the Supreme Court considered 
whether the Fourth Amendment permits involuntary medical treatment 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of a crime are Schmerber v. 
California and Winston v. Lee.89  In Schmerber, the Court ruled that 
compelling Armando Schmerber, whom the police suspected of having 
driven under the influence of alcohol, to submit to a blood test did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.90  The Court noted that blood tests are “a 
commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations” and also 
that “for most people the procedure involves no risk, trauma, or pain.”91  
Moreover, such tests are both “highly effective” in determining whether 
an individual is intoxicated92 as well as necessary for achieving the 
public health goal of diminishing drunk driving.93  The Court was careful to 
state that its decision was limited to approving the minor intrusion of a 
blood test and was not a license allowing more substantial intrusions.94 
In Winston v. Lee, the Court demonstrated that it meant what it had 
 
 88. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) (“The forcible injection of 
medication into a nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with 
that person’s liberty.”); see also id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substantial risk of 
permanent injury . . . .”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (“In the case of 
antipsychotic drugs like Mellaril, that interference is particularly severe . . . .”). 
 89. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767. 
 90. 384 U.S. at 771. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 763 (explaining that “given the difficulty of proving 
drunkenness by other means, . . . results of the blood test were of vital importance if the 
State were to enforce its drunken driving laws”); see also William G. Ross, 
Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure—Court-Ordered Surgical Removal of a Bullet 
from an Unconsenting Defendant for Evidentiary Purposes Held Reasonable Under the 
Fourth Amendment, 55 TEX. L. REV. 147, 157 (1977) (noting “[t]he direct deterrent 
relationship between blood tests and a reduction in drunken driving”). 
 94. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“That we today hold that 
the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual’s body 
under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial 
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.”).  Not all of the Justices shared the 
majority’s assessment of a blood test as a minor intrusion.  Justice Fortas called the 
blood test “an act of violence.”  Id. at 779 (Fortas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas called 
it “forcible bloodletting.”  Id. at 779 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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said in Schmerber about not authorizing more substantial intrusions.95  
Rudolph Lee was charged with attempted robbery and malicious 
wounding; the state alleged that Lee and his intended victim, Ralph 
Watkinson, had exchanged gunshots, with a bullet from Watkinson’s 
gun ending up lodged in Lee’s chest.96  The government wanted to compel 
Lee to undergo surgery so that the bullet could be removed and tested to 
prove Lee’s identity as the person who attempted to rob Watkinson.97  
The potential harmfulness of the surgery to Lee was uncertain, seemingly 
because doctors were unsure about how difficult it would be to locate the 
bullet.98  The surgery might but might not have required “extensive 
probing and retracting of the muscle tissue,” which might but might not 
have caused tissue damage and infection.99  The Supreme Court did not 
allow the government to compel this surgery, in part because of the 
uncertainty about its harmfulness,100 in part because any involuntary 
surgery is a substantial intrusion,101 and in part because the government 
did not have a compelling need to recover the bullet.102 
These Fourth Amendment cases take a better approach than does Sell 
to deciding whether to allow involuntary medical treatment.  The Fourth 
Amendment approach balances the likelihood and the severity of any 
physical harms that the defendant might experience as a result of the 
involuntary treatment against the government’s interest that the treatment 
promotes.  The blood test in Schmerber was reasonable because it posed 
virtually no risk of any physical harm and was “highly effective” in 
 
 95. 470 U.S. at 755. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 764. 
 99. Id.  The appellate court summarized the risks: 
[O]ne surgeon testified that the procedure, excluding the anesthesia, would 
take only 15–20 minutes; another surgeon predicted the procedure could take 
up to 2 1/2 hours to complete.  An expert testified that there was virtually no 
risk of muscle or tissue damage; another stated that these problems were 
possibilities.  Several doctors testified that the procedure would be considered 
“minor surgery”; another doctor claimed that there was no such thing as minor 
surgery. 
Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d 888, 900 (4th Cir. 1983). 
 100. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985) (“The medical risks of the operation, 
although apparently not extremely severe, are a subject of considerable dispute; the very 
uncertainty militates against finding the operation to be ‘reasonable.’”); id. at 764 (“The 
court properly took the resulting uncertainty about the medical risks into account.”). 
 101. Id. at 759 (“A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for 
evidence, however, implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude 
that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”). 
 102. Id. at 765 (“[A]lthough we recognize the difficulty of making determinations 
in advance as to the strength of the case against respondent, petitioners’ assertions of a 
compelling need for the bullet are hardly persuasive.”). 
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identifying drunk drivers,103 while the surgery in Winston was unreasonable 
because it posed an uncertain risk of possibly serious physical harm and 
was not essential to the government’s case against the defendant.104  The 
due process approach to deciding whether to allow involuntary 
medications—the Sell approach—is inadequate because it is not so much 
a balancing test as a categorical or threshold test.  It does not ask courts 
to weigh the potential harms that an incompetent criminal defendant is 
likely to experience as a result of the medications against the government’s 
interest in bringing that defendant to trial.  Instead, Sell asks courts to 
decide whether the government has an “important” interest and also to 
decide, but as a separate inquiry, whether involuntary antipsychotics are 
“medically appropriate.”105 
III.  INCOMPETENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS AND INVOLUNTARY 
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATIONS 
A.  Schizophrenia and Incompetence to Stand Trial 
Schizophrenia is widely considered to be among the most serious of 
mental illnesses.106  Its overarching impairment is a loss of contact with 
reality, including such symptoms as delusions, or beliefs not based in 
reality, and hallucinations, or perceptual experiences not based in 
reality.107 
Some defendants with schizophrenia, or a related psychotic disorder, 
have delusional beliefs that preclude their ability to understand the trial 
process or to assist their attorneys and that therefore make them incompetent 
 
 103. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966). 
 104. Winston, 470 U.S. at 755. 
 105. See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (discussing Sell test). 
 106. See Steven M. Paul, Introduction: The New Pharmacotherapy of Schizophrenia, in 
CURRENT ISSUES IN THE PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA xvii (Alan Breier et al. 
eds., 2001) (referring to schizophrenia as “arguably the most severe and disabling of the 
major psychiatric disorders”).  According to the American Psychiatric Association, “[t]he 
characteristic symptoms of Schizophrenia involve a range of cognitive and emotional 
dysfunctions that include perception, inferential thinking, language and communication, 
behavioral monitoring, affect, fluency and productivity of thought and speech, hedonic 
capacity, volition and drive, and attention.”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 299 (4th ed. text rev. 2000) [hereinafter 
DSM-IV-TR]. 
 107. See GERALD C. DAVISON & JOHN M. NEALE, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 284–85 
(8th ed. 2001) (defining delusions as “beliefs held contrary to reality” and hallucinations 
as “sensory experiences in the absence of any stimulation from the environment”). 
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to stand trial.108  For example, defendants with schizophrenia have been 
found incompetent to stand trial because they have delusional beliefs 
either about the facts of the crime—such as a defendant’s belief that “he 
had not in fact murdered his mother, as he had used only rubber 
bullets”109 or that “people who are killed are not really dead”110—or 
about the judicial process—such as a defendant’s belief that he was 
being “persecuted by ‘right wingers’ and the government”111 or that “the 
police are trying to get him to ‘the court of lords.’”112  Although treatment 
recommendations for schizophrenia include not only antipsychotic 
medications but also psychosocial therapies,113 it is treatment with 
medications that is most likely to alleviate the acute symptoms of 
psychosis.114 
 
 108. To be competent to stand trial, a defendant must possess both “sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him.”  Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (quoting Dusky v. United 
States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2000) (instructing trial 
courts to hold competency hearings if “there is reasonable cause to believe that the 
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him 
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and 
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense”).  The 
competence requirement protects the defendant’s right to a fair trial: 
Unless a defendant is competent, the State cannot put him on trial.  
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of 
those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to testify on one’s own behalf or to remain silent 
without penalty for doing so. 
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 109. Amador v. State, 712 So. 2d 1179, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 110. United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 111. United States v. Evans, No. 102CR00136, 2004 WL 533473, at *1 (W.D. Va. 
Mar. 18, 2004), vacated and remanded, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 112. Commonwealth v. Crowley, 471 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Mass. 1984). 
 113. See Anthony F. Lehman et al., The Schizophrenia Patient Outcomes Research 
Team (PORT): Updated Treatment Recommendations 2003, 30 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 193, 
201 (2004) (“For most persons with schizophrenia, the combination of psychopharmacologic 
and psychosocial interventions improves outcomes.”). 
 114. See John M. Kane, Conventional Neuroleptic Treatment: Current Status, 
Future Role, in THE NEW PHARMACOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA 89, 90 (Alan Breier 
ed., 1996) (describing antipsychotic medications as “the primary modality in the 
treatment of an acute episode or an acute exacerbation of a schizophrenic illness”); 
Thomas H. McGlashon, Rationale and Parameters for Medication-Free Research in 
Psychosis, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 300, 301 (2006) (noting that antipsychotic medications 
are “the most rapid, effective, and economical treatment for active psychosis”). 
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B.  Antipsychotic Medications 101 
For many people with schizophrenia, antipsychotic medications are 
lifesaving, literally as well as figuratively.115  But even when taken 
voluntarily, these medications are not without significant problems, 
including the likelihood of serious side effects.116  A large part of the 
difficulty in treating schizophrenia is finding an antipsychotic medication 
that does not cause intolerable side effects.117  The American Psychiatric 
 
 115. As one schizophrenia researcher explains: 
Active psychosis is a dangerous, life-threatening state.  Behavior is often 
unpredictable because of misperceptions, misconceptions, and irrational 
thinking.  The gravest dangers are suicide, homicide, and physical injury.  
Almost as important are paralyses of judgment and empathy resulting in 
violations of social convention and trust and leading ultimately to social 
isolation and stigmatization.  For persons in this state of mind, antipsychotic 
medications are unquestionably a powerful therapeutic tool. 
McGlashon, supra note 114, at 300. 
Before the development of antipsychotics, schizophrenia was essentially untreatable, 
and the back wards of state hospitals were filled with people who had little to no chance 
of ever leaving: 
Prior to 1950, effective drugs for treating psychotic patients were virtually 
nonexistent, and psychotic patients were usually permanently or semipermanently 
hospitalized; by 1955, more than half a million psychotic persons in the United 
States were residing in mental hospitals.  In 1956, a dramatic and steady reversal in 
this trend began.  By 1983, fewer than 220,000 were institutionalized.  This 
decline occurred despite a doubling in the numbers of admissions to state hospitals.  
By the early 1990s, people with schizophrenia were routinely stabilized on 
medication and discharged from institutions quite rapidly.  What accounted for 
this dramatic shift was a class of drugs called the phenothiazines. 
ROBERT M. JULIEN, A PRIMER OF DRUG ACTION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE 
ACTIONS, USES, AND SIDE EFFECTS OF PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 346–47 (10th ed. 2005) 
(footnote omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
 116. According to the American Psychiatric Association: 
Side effects of medications are a crucial aspect of treatment because they often 
determine medication choice and are a primary reason for medication 
discontinuation.  Side effects can complicate and undermine antipsychotic 
treatment in various ways.  The side effects themselves may cause or worsen 
symptoms associated with schizophrenia, including negative, positive, and 
cognitive symptoms and agitation.  In addition, these side effects may contribute to 
risk for other medical disorders.  Finally, these side effects often are subjectively 
difficult to tolerate and may affect the patient’s quality of life and willingness 
to take the medication. 
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR THE TREATMENT OF PATIENTS WITH 
SCHIZOPHRENIA 66–67 (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter APA PRACTICE GUIDELINES]. 
 117. One recent study designed to evaluate the effectiveness of various 
antipsychotic medications in treating people with chronic schizophrenia reported that of 
nearly 1500 subjects, between sixty-four and eighty-two percent discontinued treatment 
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Association defines a “recommended dose” of antipsychotic medication 
as “that which is both effective and not likely to cause side effects that 
are subjectively difficult to tolerate.”118 
There are two categories of antipsychotic medications, each with its 
own set of risks.  The first category, called first-generation antipsychotics, 
typical antipsychotics, or neuroleptics,119 has as its most serious risk 
neurological syndromes such as tardive dyskinesia,120 while the second 
category, called second-generation or atypical antipsychotics, is more 
likely to cause metabolic disorders such as diabetes.121 
1.  Side Effects of First-Generation Antipsychotics 
The first generation of antipsychotic medications was developed in the 
1950s, and these drugs are believed to alleviate psychotic symptoms 
primarily by blocking the activity of the neurotransmitter dopamine in 
certain areas of the brain.122  This dopamine-blocking effect can also 
lead to neurological disorders.123  Perhaps the most serious neurological 
disorder that typical antipsychotics cause is tardive dyskinesia, which is 
characterized by involuntary, irregular movements.124  Common symptoms 
include tongue twisting and lip smacking as well as hyperkinetic 
movements of the arms, legs, and trunk.125  Tardive dyskinesia is not 
curable, and the standard treatment recommendation—discontinuation of 
 
during the first phase of the study.  Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic 
Drugs in Patients with Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1215 
(2005).  The study’s authors attributed the high rate of treatment discontinuation to 
“intolerable side effects.”  Id. at 1218 (“There were no significant differences among the 
drugs in the time until discontinuation of treatment owing to intolerable side effects.”). 
 118. APA PRACTICE GUIDELINES, supra note 116, at 11. 
 119. These drugs are called “neuroleptics” because they cause disorders with the 
same symptoms as neurological diseases.  See DAVISON &  NEALE, supra note 107, at 
305; JULIEN, supra note 115, at 345 n.1. 
 120. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing side effects of first-generation antipsychotic 
medications). 
 121. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing side effects of second-generation antipsychotic 
medications). 
 122. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 340 (“Early scientific evidence favored a pure 
dopamine theory of schizophrenia: the disorder arises from dysregulation in certain brain 
regions of the dopamine system, resulting in a relative surplus of dopamine in the brain.  
Antipsychotic drugs therefore work by blocking dopamine receptors, an action that 
qualifies them as dopamine receptor antagonists.” (citation and emphases omitted)). 
 123. Parkinson’s disease, for example, is caused by the death of dopamine-
producing cells in the motor area of the brain.  Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and 
Stroke, NINDS Parkinson’s Disease Information Page (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www. 
ninds.nih.gov/disorders/parkinsons_disease/parkinsons_disease.htm (“Parkinson’s disease 
(PD) belongs to a group of conditions called motor system disorders, which are the result 
of the loss of dopamine-producing brain cells.”). 
 124. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 353. 
 125. Id. 
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antipsychotic medications—amounts to exchanging the symptoms of 
one horrific, incurable disorder for another.126  Once tardive dyskinesia 
develops, the patient’s choices are to treat the psychosis and endure the 
tardive dyskinesia or to treat the tardive dyskinesia and endure the 
psychosis.127 
Two other very disabling neurological disorders that the typical 
antipsychotics can cause are dystonia and akathisia.128  Dystonia is 
characterized by sustained muscle spasms that produce involuntary 
movements and abnormal postures.129  Akathisia is characterized by 
feelings of restlessness and anxiety.130  At its most severe, the experience 
of akathisia is so distressing that some people become suicidal.131 
In addition to these neurological side effects, the first-generation 
antipsychotic medications can also cause a long list of other kinds of side 
effects, including sedation, impaired cognitive functioning, autonomic 
effects such as blurred vision and reduced blood pressure, and a rare but 
potentially fatal reaction, neuroleptic malignant syndrome.132 
2.  Side Effects of Second-Generation Antipsychotics 
In the 1990s, researchers developed a new generation of antipsychotic 
medications that are believed to alleviate psychotic symptoms by altering 
the activity of dopamine and an additional neurotransmitter, usually 
 
 126. Id. (noting that tardive dyskinesia is “often irreversible”). 
 127. See Nat’l Inst. of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Tardive 
Dyskinesia Information Page (Feb. 14, 2007), http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/tardive 
/tardive.htm (“There is no standard treatment for tardive dyskinesia.  Treatment is highly 
individualized.  The first step is generally to stop or minimize the use of the neuroleptic 
drug.  However, for patients with a severe underlying condition this may not be a 
feasible option.”). 
 128. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 352. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (“Akathesia [is] a syndrome of the subjective feeling of anxiety, accompanied 
by restlessness, pacing, constant rocking back and forth, and other repetitive, purposeless 
actions.”). 
 131. E. Cem Atbaşǒglu et al., The Relationship of Akathisia with Suicidality and 
Depersonalization Among Patients with Schizophrenia, 13 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & 
CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 336, 336 (2001) (“Akathisia, characterized by a state of 
subjective and motor restlessness, is a common and unpleasant side effect of 
antipsychotic medication.  Case reports have described both suicidality and violence as 
being precipitated by this distressing condition.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 132. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 354–55. 
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serotonin.133  These drugs were initially praised as “wonder drugs,” capable 
of treating people who had not responded to other, typical medications 
yet not likely to produce any of the neurological side effects commonly 
observed with the older antipsychotics—hence the term “atypical.”134  
Both of these early assessments have proven to have been overly 
optimistic.  Atypicals do work when other drugs have not, but some 
people still are unresponsive even to these newer medications.135  
Moreover, whereas atypicals were initially thought not to cause the same 
neurological disorders as the typical antipsychotics, more recent data 
suggests that the difference is in the dosage—that atypicals, if 
administered in doses comparable to the typical antipsychotics, produce 
similar levels of neurological side effects.136  And like the traditional 
antipsychotics, the atypicals also cause a long list of other side effects, 
ranging in seriousness from life-threatening—agranulocytosis (a loss of 
white blood cells) and myocarditis (inflammation of the heart muscle) 
are two potentially fatal side effects of Clozaril,137 the most risky but in 
 
 133. Id. at 341–42 (“There is no consensus concerning the biological mechanisms 
that might impart and define an atypical antipsychotic.  Atypical antipsychotics display 
more than one mechanism for achieving atypicality.  Almost all of these drugs are 
antagonists at dopamine-2 receptors and have a second action, usually antagonism of the 
serotonin 5-HT2 receptors.” (citations omitted)). 
 134. See id. at 346, 360–61. 
 135. Id. at 360 (estimating that between thirty and sixty percent of people who were 
unresponsive to other drugs improved on Clozaril, one of the first atypical 
antipsychotics).  Some recent research suggests that, in general, atypical antipsychotics 
are no more effective than the typical medications.  See Shôn Lewis & Jeffrey 
Lieberman, CATIE and CUtLASS: Can We Handle the Truth?, 192 BRITISH J. 
PSYCHIATRY 161, 161–63 (2008). 
 136. Shitij Kapur et al., Relationship Between rDopamine D2 Occupancy, Clinical 
Response, and Side Effects: A Double-Blind PET Study of First-Episode Schizophrenia, 
157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 514, 517 (2000); Lieberman et al., supra note 117, at 1218 
(suggesting that administering high doses of first generation antipsychotics “may have 
biased previous comparisons of first- and second-generation drugs”). 
 137. See Jose Ma. J. Alvir et al., Clozapine Induced Agranulocytosis: Incidence and 
Risk Factors in the United States, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 162, 162–67 (1993) (reporting 
incidence and fatality rate from agranulocytosis in patients treated with Clozaril); J.G. 
Kilian et al., Myocarditis and Cardiomyopathy Associated with Clozapine, 354 LANCET 
1841, 1841 (1999) (“Clozapine therapy may be associated with potentially fatal 
myocarditis and cardiomyopathy in physically healthy young adults with 
schizophrenia.”). 
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many cases the most effective atypical antipsychotic138—to fairly minor, 
including dry mouth, headaches, and insomnia.139 
Although life-threatening side effects are rare, the second-generation 
antipsychotics commonly cause metabolic disorders such as obesity and 
hyperglycemia.140  Perhaps because these disorders are not uncommon 
among the general population, courts in some cases seem rather unconcerned 
about these side effects.  The court in United States v. Archuleta, for example, 
appears to be as indifferent as the court in Evans141 to the effect that 
involuntary antipsychotic medications will have on Archuleta’s diabetes: 
“Any health side effects, such as aggravation of diabetes, are medically 
treatable and such treatments are commonplace and successful in this 
area of medical practice.”142  In United States v. Weston, the court allowed 
the government to continue administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications despite Weston’s physician’s testimony that the medications 
were responsible for Weston’s seventy-pound weight gain.143  The court 
confessed that it was “troubled by the defendant’s weight gain on the 
anti-psychotic medications”144 but nevertheless found that the medications’ 
 
 138. See Robert W. Buckman & Randy D. Malan, Clozapine for Refractory 
Schizophrenia: The Illinois Experience, 60 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (SUPPLEMENT 1) 18, 
18 (1999) (noting that Clozaril “has become the gold standard for treating drug-resistant 
patients”); Juan R. Bustillo et al., The Psychosocial Treatment of Schizophrenia: An 
Update, 158 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 163, 173 (2001) (noting that “[s]uperiority for 
previously resistant psychotic symptoms has been demonstrated only for clozapine”). 
 139. JULIEN, supra note 115, at 364 (listing insomnia and headache as common side 
effects of Risperdal); id. at 366 (listing dry mouth as a side effect of Zyprexa). 
 140. “The safety advantages of the atypical drugs have been questioned because of 
their propensity to induce weight gain and alter glucose and lipid metabolism.”  
Lieberman et al., supra note 117, at 1210; see also JULIEN, supra note 115, at 369–72. 
 141. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Evans case). 
 142. United States v. Archuleta, No. 2:05CR0676 TC, 2006 WL 2476070, at *4 (D. 
Utah, Aug. 24, 2006), aff’d, 218 F. App’x 754 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 143. According to the district court that monitored Weston’s progress while he was 
being administered involuntary antipsychotics: 
On June 20, 2004, Mr. Weston’s weight was recorded at 317 pounds.  The 
defendant has gained 70 pounds since he was initially placed at Butner.  A 
general practitioner brought in to evaluate Mr. Weston described him as 
“morbidly obese.”  With regard to this issue, Dr. Johnson has testified that “the 
principal contributor in his weight gain is clearly his medication use. There is no 
doubt about that. It is associated with significant weight gain.” 
United States v. Weston, 326 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67–68 (D.D.C. 2004) (2004 progress 
hearing) (citations omitted). 
 144. Id. at 68. 
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“continued use remains medically appropriate.”145 
Despite the sanguine attitudes of these courts toward defendants who 
have become morbidly obese or who are well on their way to developing 
insulin-dependent diabetes, neither of these conditions is insignificant.  
Both cause a wide range of long-term, exceedingly harmful, potentially 
fatal complications, some of which can be difficult if not impossible to 
treat fully. 
a.  Obesity 
This disease presently is the topic of several conversations among 
legal scholars; all of these conversations reflect the recognition that 
obesity is a serious, life-threatening illness.  First, some courts have 
decided that morbid obesity can be grounds for removing a child from 
his or her parents’ care.146  These decisions—rightly, most commentators 
seem to believe—place obesity in the same category as other, more 
traditional forms of child abuse.147  Second, tort theory has been widely 
discussed as a possible basis for suing manufacturers whose products 
might cause obesity.148  And finally, government taxation and other 
 
 145. Id.  After more than two years of involuntary treatment with antipsychotic 
medications, however, Weston remained too delusional to be brought to trial.  In 2004, 
the government conceded that further involuntary treatment was unlikely to render 
Weston competent.  United States v. Weston, No. 98-357 (EGS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23579, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2004). 
 146. See Shireen Arani, Case Comment, State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-
Related Medical Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 875–76 (2002) (discussing the case of an 
obese three-year-old child removed from her parents’ custody because they refused to 
follow medical advice regarding her diet); Laura A. Kelley, What Should Be the 
Standards for Intervening Between Parent and Child? The Parental Prosecution for a 
Young Boy’s Obesity, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 7, 8–10 (2001) (discussing the case of an 
obese four-year-old boy, who was placed in foster care and whose parents were charged 
with criminal neglect); see also Lindsey Murtagh, Judicial Interventions for Morbidly 
Obese Children, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 497, 497 (2007) (noting that “courts in 
California, Iowa, Indiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Texas . . . have recognized 
morbid obesity as an issue warranting state intervention into the family unit”). 
 147. See, e.g., Marshall L. Wilde, Bioethical and Legal Implications of Pediatric 
Gastric Bypass, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 575, 576 (2004) (“The modern recognition of 
pediatric obesity as a threat to long-term health has given rise to a legal recognition that 
parents who fail to treat their child’s obesity can be held accountable for medical 
neglect.”). 
 148. E.g., Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), vacated in part and remanded, 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005) (suit against 
McDonald’s filed by parents of two obese teenagers alleging deceptive acts, negligence, 
and failure to warn); M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1335, 1356 (2005) (arguing that “[f]oods that fail the consumer expectations or 
risk-utility tests for defective design should be subject to liability” but also predicting 
that “the difficulty of proving causation-in-fact (by tying a food product to a person’s 
illness) will typically preclude pro-plaintiff judgments”); Rogan Kersh & James A. 
Morone, Obesity, Courts, and the New Politics of Public Health, 30 J. HEALTH POL. 
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forms of regulation to combat the “obesity epidemic”149 have been 
proposed.150 
Obesity may well be the leading cause of preventable deaths in the 
United States.151  Obesity is responsible for 300,000 deaths per year, and 
people who are obese have a fifty to one hundred percent increased risk 
of premature death from weight-related health problems.152  The Social 
Security Administration regards obesity as a potential disability.153  In 
2004, the Health and Human Services Secretary announced that Medicare 
would begin to pay for some types of obesity treatments, noting that 
“[o]besity is a critical public health problem in our country that causes 
millions of Americans to suffer unnecessary health problems and to die 
prematurely.”154  According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
obesity “substantially” increases the risk of death from such causes as 
hypertension, type II diabetes, coronary artery disease, stroke, gallbladder 
 
POL’Y & L. 839, 863 (2005) (“Tort lawyers have filed dozens of class-action suits on 
behalf of obese litigants.”); Jeremy H. Rogers, Note, Living on the Fat of the Land: How 
to Have Your Burger and Sue It Too, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 859, 883 (2003) (recommending 
class action lawsuits against “Big Food”). 
 149. Marlene B. Schwartz & Kelly D. Brownell, Actions Necessary to Prevent 
Childhood Obesity: Creating the Climate for Change, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 78, 78 
(2007) (noting the use of “terms like ‘epidemic,’ ‘crisis,’ and ‘emergency’”). 
 150. See Kelly D. Brownell, Get Slim With Higher Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 
1994, at A29; Hanna Rosin, The Fat Tax, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 19, cited in 
Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) To Do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 
93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1375 (2005); Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role 
of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1224–27 (2005) 
(discussing “junk-food taxes” and “fat taxes”). 
 151. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE 
SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND 
OBESITY 8 (2001), available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/calltoaction/ 
CalltoAction.pdf [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION]. 
 152. David Burnett, Fast-Food Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing 
Congress’s Response to the Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 358 
(2007) (citing SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION, supra note 151, at 8); see also 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., TECHNICAL REPORT SERIES NO. 894, OBESITY: PREVENTING AND 
MANAGING THE GLOBAL EPIDEMIC 2 (2000) (describing obesity as “one of the most 
significant contributors to ill health” and “a key risk factor in the natural history of other 
chronic and noncommunicable diseases”). 
 153. See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s 
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 221 n.1 (2007) 
(“SSA also acknowledges that obesity is a medically determinable impairment that may, 
on its own, warrant a finding of disability.” (citing Titles II and XVI: Evaluation of 
Obesity, S.S.R. 00-3p (Cum. Ed. 2000))). 
 154. Press Release, HHS Announces Revised Medicare Obesity Coverage Policy 
(July 15, 2004), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040715.html. 
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disease, and respiratory illnesses, as well as some cancers.155  Furthermore, 
“[h]igher body weights are also associated with an increase in mortality 
from all causes.”156 
b. Diabetes 
Diabetes is a metabolic illness.157  Type I diabetes is caused when the 
body’s immune system destroys the pancreatic cells that produce insulin, 
a hormone that regulates conversion of glucose to energy.158  People 
with type I diabetes must receive insulin by either injection or a pump.159  
People with type II diabetes initially produce insulin but their cells do 
not properly absorb it.160  Over time, though, the pancreas loses its ability to 
produce insulin.161  Type II diabetes may be treatable with oral medication, 
although more severe cases require treatment with insulin.162 
When the body lacks sufficient insulin, glucose builds up in the 
bloodstream, producing a condition called hyperglycemia.163  If untreated, 
hyperglycemia can lead to ketoacidosis, which can progress to a diabetic 
coma.164  High blood glucose levels also may damage the eyes, causing 
blurred vision and possibly leading to blindness.165  Damage to nerves in 
any part of the body is another possible consequence of high blood 
glucose levels.166  Diabetes can damage both the nerves and the blood 
vessels to the feet, causing poor circulation and possibly leading to 
 
 155. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, PUBL’N NO. 00-4084, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE: 
IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND TREATMENT OF OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY IN 
ADULTS 5 (2000), available at http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/guidelines/obesity/prctgd_c.pdf. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Corinne P. Maskaleris, Understanding Type II Diabetes: A Primer, 16 
EXPERIENCE 40, 40 (2006); see also Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Type 1 Diabetes, http://www. 
diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
 158. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., NATIONAL DIABETES FACT SHEET: GENERAL INFORMATION AND NATIONAL 
ESTIMATES ON DIABETES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2003), available at http://www. 
cdc.gov/diabetes/pubs/pdf/ndfs_2003.pdf [hereinafter DIABETES FACT SHEET]. 
 159. Id. at 2. 
 160. Id. at 1. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 2. 
 163. Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Hyperglycemia, http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes/ 
hyperglycemia.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
 164. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 7 (“Uncontrolled diabetes often 
leads to biochemical imbalances that can cause acute life-threatening events, such as 
diabetic ketoacidosis and hyperosmolar (nonketotic) coma.”). 
 165. Id. (“Diabetes is the leading cause of new cases of blindness among adults 
aged 20–74 years.”). 
 166. High blood glucose levels can cause several types of nerve damage, or diabetic 
neuropathies.  See Am. Diabetes Ass’n, Diabetic Neuropathy (Nerve Damage) and Diabetes, 
http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-diabetes/diabetic-neuropathy.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
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amputation.167  High blood glucose levels, especially if combined with 
high blood pressure, can also cause kidney damage and lead to end-stage 
renal disease—kidney failure requiring dialysis or a transplant.168  People 
with diabetes are more likely to die from pneumonia or influenza, and 
are more likely to suffer a stroke, than are people who do not have 
diabetes.169  Diabetes, especially in people with high blood pressure and 
high cholesterol, causes heart disease, which is the leading cause of 
death among people with diabetes.170  In 2002, diabetes was the sixth 
leading cause of death in the United States.171 
C.  The Inadequacies of Medical Appropriateness 
Sell charges courts with the task of deciding whether involuntary 
antipsychotic medications are “medically appropriate,” which the Court 
defines as “in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his medical 
condition.”172  For several reasons, this medical appropriateness standard 
does little if anything to guarantee that the harms of involuntary 
antipsychotic medications will be justified by the government’s interest 
in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial.  One problem with 
medical appropriateness is that in applying this standard, many courts 
have deferred more or less completely to government physicians’ 
statements that antipsychotic medications are “the standard of care” for 
people diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.  For example, the court in 
United States v. Archuleta decided, “[A]s to the medical appropriateness 
of medication, the doctor stated that ‘antipsychotic medication is the 
standard of care for psychosis, and in Mr. Archuleta’s case, schizophrenia, 
 
 167. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 7 (“More than 60% of nontraumatic 
lower-limb amputations occur among people with diabetes.”). 
 168. Id. at 6 (“Diabetes is the leading cause of end-stage renal disease, accounting 
for 44 percent of new cases [in 2002].”). 
 169. Id.  Additionally, “[p]eople with diabetes are more susceptible to many other 
illnesses and, once they acquire these illnesses, often have worse prognoses.”  Id. 
 170. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Cardiovascular 
disease affects millions of adults with diabetes and is a major cause of morbidity and 
mortality among persons with diabetes.  In 2003, 5.2 million persons aged 35 years and 
older with diabetes reported being diagnosed with a cardiovascular disease condition 
(i.e., coronary heart disease, stroke, or other heart condition).”  Ctrs. for Disease Control 
and Prevention, Number (in millions) of Persons with Diabetes Aged 35 Years and Older 
with Self-Reported CVD Conditions, United States, 1997–2003, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
diabetes/statistics/cvd/fig1.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). 
 171. DIABETES FACT SHEET, supra note 158, at 6. 
 172. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003). 
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it is the only effective treatment for it.’”173  The court’s consideration of 
medical appropriateness in United States v. Renshaw was similarly 
concise: “[T]he Court finds the administration of the antipsychotic 
medication is medically appropriate.  The Forensic Evaluation indicates 
that the administration of antipsychotic medication is a standard component 
of treatment for anyone with the Defendant’s mental condition.”174  And 
in United States v. Cortez-Perez: “Defendant suffers from Chronic 
Schizophrenia which will not likely be controlled without standard 
medication.  The proposed medication is [the] widely available standard 
treatment for persons suffering from the serious mental illness that the 
Defendant suffers.”175 
On one hand, the equation of medical appropriateness with the 
standard of care for schizophrenia cannot be what the Sell Court 
intended, because if medical appropriateness were nothing more than the 
standard of care, then antipsychotics would be appropriate for every 
defendant diagnosed with schizophrenia—and the medical appropriateness 
standard would be rendered meaningless. 
Perhaps, however, trial courts should not be criticized too harshly for 
these circumventions of Sell’s intent, because it is not apparent how, 
under Sell, courts could do much better.  Antipsychotic medications are 
in fact the standard of care for schizophrenia.  And antipsychotic medications 
are generally medically appropriate for people with schizophrenia.  All 
antipsychotics do have the potential to cause very disabling and even 
life-threatening side effects.176  But given that schizophrenia is itself 
very disabling177 and even life-threatening,178 it is the rare person with 
 
 173. 218 F. App’x 754, 757 (10th Cir. 2007).  A few courts have taken the medical 
appropriateness question more seriously.  For example, in United States v. McCray, 474 
F. Supp. 2d 671 (D.N.J. 2007), the court denied the government’s motion for involuntary 
medication, in part because:  
[T]he risk of Defendant suffering serious side effects is not insubstantial.  
When the risks of serious side effects are balanced against the questions that 
exist affecting the potential effectiveness of drug treatment, the Court cannot 
conclude by clear and convincing evidence that the potential benefits that 
outweigh the substantial risks. 
Id. at 682.  A few courts, though, grant the government’s motion with only the most 
cursory attention to medical appropriateness.  E.g., United States v. Ballesteros, No. 
2:04-CR-0144-GEB, 2006 WL 224437, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2006) (“Dr. Sarrazin’s 
testimony that the administration of the described antipsychotic medications is medically 
appropriate is credited.”); United States v. Martin, No. 1:04MJ00183, 2005 WL 
1895110, at * 4 (W.D. Va. Aug. 10, 2005) (“Finally, I find that the administration of the 
recommended medication is medically appropriate.”). 
 174. United States v. Renshaw, No. 4:06CR-31-M, 2007 WL 2746675, at *2 (W.D. 
Ky. Sept. 18, 2007). 
 175. United States v. Cortez-Perez, No. 06-CR-1290-WQH, 2007 WL 2695867, at 
*4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2007). 
 176. See supra Part III.B (discussing side effects of antipsychotic medications). 
 177. See Kim T. Mueser & Susan R. McGurk, Schizophrenia, 363 LANCET 2063, 
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schizophrenia for whom antipsychotic medications can be declared 
medically inappropriate. 
That antipsychotic medications are not medically inappropriate, 
though, does not mean that these medications cannot be unreasonably 
harmful when administered for the purpose of rendering a defendant 
competent to stand trial.  When someone with schizophrenia chooses to 
take antipsychotic medications voluntarily, for the purpose of alleviating 
his own psychotic symptoms, then it is sensible to assume that for that 
person, the benefits justify the harms.  But when the government seeks 
to administer antipsychotic medications involuntarily, for the purpose of 
advancing the government’s interest in bringing a defendant to trial, a 
court should decide whether the benefits to the government justify the 
harms to the defendant.179 
Several commentators have proposed that under Sell, courts should 
interpret “medically appropriate” to mean treatment that, in a civil 
context, a physician would be willing to prescribe.180  But harms that a 
patient is willing to accept for herself, when she concludes that the 
benefits to her own well-being are worth those harms, are not necessarily 
the same harms that a court should accept for her, when the purpose of 
administering the medications is to benefit the government.  Put 
differently, should the fact that some people decide to take antipsychotic 
 
2063 (2004) (“Schizophrenia is a mental illness that is among the world’s top ten causes 
of long-term disability.”).  For a compelling first-person account of schizophrenia, see 
generally ELYN R. SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD: MY JOURNEY THROUGH MADNESS 
(2007). 
 178. Schizophrenia is associated with “an alarmingly high” rate of suicide.  Alan 
Breier, Introduction: A New Era in the Pharmacotherapy of Psychotic Disorders, 62 J. 
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (SUPPLEMENT 2) 3, 3 (2001); see also JULIEN, supra note 115, at 
337 (reporting that “approximately 10 to 15 percent of individuals with schizophrenia 
take their own lives, usually within the first 10 years of developing the disorder”). 
 179. This is why the issue of side effects is not a strictly medical one.  The decision 
to be made is not whether the benefits to the defendant justify the risk of side effects but 
rather whether the benefits to the government justify the risk of side effects.  See supra 
note 70. 
 180. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
1114, 1130 (2008) (proposing that medical appropriateness be defined as treatment that 
is “the ‘right treatment for the condition,’ assuming the defendant was not on trial”); 
Rebekah W. Page, Comment, Forcible Medication and the Fourth Amendment: A New 
Framework for Protecting Nondangerous Mentally Ill Pretrial Detainees Against 
Unreasonable Governmental Intrusions into the Body, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1087 
(2005) (arguing that “there should be a separate, medical determination that 
antipsychotic medication is the best treatment option for the patient, regardless of the 
government’s interest in the matter”). 
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medications voluntarily for the purpose of enhancing their own well-
being help to justify a court’s decision to compel people to take these 
medications involuntarily for the purpose of furthering the government’s 
interest in bringing them to trial?  It is hard to imagine that the answer 
should be anything other than no: Administering a voluntary medication 
that both benefits and harms the individual who is taking the medication 
is very different from administering an involuntary medication that 
benefits the government and harms the individual.181 
Some courts have proposed that administering involuntary antipsychotic 
medications does benefit as well as harm the defendant, even if it also 
benefits the government.  For example, in approving involuntary medication 
for the purpose of rendering the defendant competent to stand trial, the 
court in United States v. Algere wrote that “[t]he proposed treatment has 
numerous potential positive effects and is expected to significantly improve 
Algere’s quality of life.”182  It is of course true that schizophrenia is a 
disease that causes tremendous suffering, and it is also true that 
antipsychotic medications often alleviate at least some of that suffering.  
But as the court explained in United States v. Dumeny, “[t]he issue 
before the court is not whether Mr. Dumeny should voluntarily accept 
treatment, but whether the court should order him to do so against his 
will.”183  Justifying involuntary medication on the grounds that it will 
benefit the defendant fails to take adequate account of the defendant’s 
own decision not to take the medications voluntarily.  If the defendant 
believed that the medication’s benefits to him justified the medication’s 
harms, he would choose to take the medication voluntarily.184  And 
 
 181. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Winston v. Lee, explaining 
that voluntary general anesthesia is different from involuntary general anesthesia: 
When conducted with the consent of the patient, surgery requiring general 
anesthesia is not necessarily demeaning or intrusive.  In such a case, the 
surgeon is carrying out the patient’s own will concerning the patient’s body 
and the patient’s right to privacy is therefore preserved.  In this case, however, 
the Court of Appeals noted that the Commonwealth proposes to take control of 
respondent’s body, to “drug this citizen—not yet convicted of a criminal 
offense—with narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness,” and 
then to search beneath his skin for evidence of a crime.  This kind of surgery 
involves a virtually total divestment of respondent’s ordinary control over 
surgical probing beneath his skin. 
470 U.S. 753, 765 (1985) (citation omitted). 
 182. United States v. Algere, 396 F. Supp. 2d 734, 746 (E.D. La. 2005). 
 183. United States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 133 (D. Me. 2004). 
 184. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (explaining that “a medical 
doctor, being the expert, appreciates the risks inherent in the procedure he is prescribing, 
the risks of a decision not to undergo the treatment, and the probability of a successful 
outcome of the treatment” but that “[t]he weighing of these risks against the individual 
subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill”—instead, it is “a 
nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone”); Kevin W. Williams, Managing 
Physician Financial Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trials Conducted in the Private 
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while some people with schizophrenia are incapable of understanding 
the harms and benefits of antipsychotic medications, courts deem such 
people incompetent to make their own medical treatment decisions and 
appoint others to make those decisions for them.185  Most defendants 
who are incompetent to stand trial, though, have not been ruled incompetent 
to make their own medical treatment decisions.186  Moreover, the 
 
Practice Setting, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 45, 50 (2004) (noting that “the patient’s best 
interest” is not necessarily the same as “the best medical treatment in a given situation” 
because the patient’s best interest cannot be determined without considering “the 
individual patient’s philosophical, moral, and religious beliefs; economic constraints; 
family situation; and a myriad of other interests to which the physician is not privy”). 
 185. See William M. Brooks, Reevaluating Substantive Due Process as a Source of 
Protection for Psychiatric Patients to Refuse Drugs, 31 IND. L. REV. 937, 1002 (1998) 
(“The state interest in forcibly medicating patients in order to provide treatment to 
legally competent patients who could benefit from treatment is not sufficiently 
compelling.  It is well-settled that the government may not confine for compulsory 
treatment individuals who are mentally ill, but are not dangerous.” (citing Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 
(1975); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983); Doremus v. Farrell, 
407 F. Supp. 509, 514 (D. Neb. 1975))). 
 186. Russell Weston, for example, was administered involuntary medications for 
more than two years but was never found to be incompetent to make his own medical 
decisions.  See United States v. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d 99, 112 (D.D.C. 1999) (“Despite 
the defendant’s suggestion that the Court determine whether he is functionally competent 
to make medical decisions and, if he is not, to appoint a guardian ad litem, the defendant 
has failed to present any evidence to contradict Dr. Johnson’s opinion that he is 
competent to consent to the medication.” (emphasis omitted)).  One scholar has argued 
that “virtually all defendants who are incompetent to stand trial are also incompetent to 
make treatment decisions.”  CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT 
DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 230 (2006); see also 
Robert F. Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal 
Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 495, 503–08 (2006) 
(proposing that incompetent criminal defendants are necessarily incompetent to make 
medical treatment decisions, although arguably assuming a standard of competency to 
make medical treatment decisions that is more demanding than any actual standard).  It 
is most likely true that a good many more defendants do lack the capacity to understand 
the harms and benefits of antipsychotic medications than are currently being found 
incompetent to make treatment decisions.  But there are reasons why a defendant might 
be incompetent to stand trial but nevertheless be competent to make treatment decisions.  
One reason is that tests of competency to make treatment decisions are usually narrowly 
focused cognitive tests that do not take account of impairments in emotion, volition, or 
other psychological functions, or even of cognitive capacities unrelated to understanding 
the direct harms and benefits of medications.  See Marsha Garrison, The Empire of 
Illness: Competence and Coercion in Health-Care Decisionmaking, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 781, 789–90 (2007) (“What these varied tests [of competence to make treatment 
decisions] share is an exclusive focus on cognitive capacity.  A patient may be confused, 
combative, depressed, or despairing.  But if she can accurately describe the treatment 
choice, its corollary risks, and its potential benefits to her, she is competent to consent 
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government cannot add together all of the incidental benefits of 
antipsychotic medications to justify involuntary administration of these 
medications for the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand 
trial.  If rendering the defendant competent to stand trial is the government 
interest that justifies the involuntary medications, then whether the 
medications benefit the defendant is irrelevant.  If benefit to the 
individual were the government interest that justified the involuntary 
medications, as it is in some civil commitments, then the government 
would need to satisfy the requirements of such a commitment—
requirements that usually include dangerousness to self as well as 
incompetence to make medical treatment decisions.187 
In sum, the “medically appropriate” standard allows trial courts to all 
but ignore the harms that a defendant might experience if administered 
involuntary antipsychotic medications—even though the harms might 
outweigh the benefit the government will derive from administering the 
medications.  Asking whether antipsychotic medications are medically 
appropriate inadequately protects defendants from harms that are not 
justified by a sufficiently important government interest, because if the 
defendant has been properly diagnosed with schizophrenia, the answer 
will almost invariably be yes, regardless of how substantial the risk of 
harms—or even how substantial the experience of actual harms—and 
regardless of how important the government’s interest in bringing the 
defendant to trial, so long as the government’s interest is some degree of 
“important.”  Instead, what courts should ask is whether the government’s 
interest in bringing the defendant to trial is important enough to justify 
the harms of involuntary antipsychotic medications. 
IV.  LESSONS FROM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: HOW MUCH HARM CAN 
ONE TRIAL JUSTIFY? 
A.  “Risk, Trauma, or Pain” 
In Winston and Schmerber, the Supreme Court was reluctant to allow 
 
under all existing standards.”).  Moreover, some defendants are incompetent to stand 
trial because of circumscribed delusional beliefs about some aspect of the trial process.  
See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text (describing delusional beliefs of some 
defendants found incompetent to stand trial).  But so long as the defendant’s delusional 
system does not encompass his physicians or other medical professionals, or drug 
manufacturers, it is possible that a defendant who is incompetent to stand trial could be 
capable of making a competent decision regarding his own medical treatment. 
 187. Cf. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 181 (2003) (“We emphasize that the 
court applying these standards is seeking to determine whether involuntary administration of 
drugs is necessary significantly to further a particular governmental interest, namely, the 
interest in rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.”). 
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involuntary medical treatment for the purpose of advancing the 
government’s interests if the treatment the government sought to order 
was likely to cause any physical harms at all.188  Compared to the 
physical harms that Lee might have experienced as a result of bullet 
removal surgery,189 the physical harms that defendants might experience, 
and in some cases have actually experienced, as a result of involuntary 
antipsychotic medications are arguably at least as substantial.190 
No court has allowed the government to compel a defendant to submit 
to what the court has deemed “major surgery” for the purpose of 
promoting the government’s interest in obtaining evidence of a crime: 
Whenever a court finds that a proposed surgical procedure is “major,” 
the government’s request to compel the surgery is denied.191  In denying 
these requests, courts cite the “risk, trauma, or pain” that major surgery 
 
 188. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 768 (1966). 
 189. See supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text (discussing risks to Lee of bullet 
removal surgery). 
 190. See supra Part III.B (discussing risks of antipsychotic medications). 
 191. On one hand are the courts that find a proposed involuntary surgery to be 
major and then deny the government’s request to compel the defendant to undergo the 
surgery.  E.g., Bowden v. State, 510 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Ark. 1974) (disallowing “major 
intrusion into the petitioner’s body involving trauma, pain and possible risk of life even 
when performed in a proper medical environment with the most careful and skilled 
attention”); People v. Smith, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909, 914 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (“[T]he 
proposed operation would constitute a major intrusion into the body of the respondent 
that would involve trauma and pain and a possible risk of life and is over and beyond the 
minor intrusion standard set down in Schmerber v. California.”); State v. Allen, 291 
S.E.2d 459, 463 (S.C. 1982) (finding that removing bullet would require “major surgery 
procedures involving a substantial intrusion into [the defendant’s] body and risk to his 
health, safety or life”); cf. United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 261 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.P.R. 
2003) (denying government request for involuntary surgery because court could not 
conclude that the surgery would not threaten the defendant’s safety); Bloom v. Starkey, 
409 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (same).  On the other hand are the courts 
that find a proposed involuntary surgery not to be major and then grant the government’s 
request to compel the defendant to undergo the surgery.  E.g., United States v. Crowder, 
543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“The operation was minor . . . .”); Hughes v. United 
States, 429 A.2d 1339, 1341 (D.C. 1981) (accepting trial court’s finding that “the 
removal of the presumed bullets from under appellant’s skin would be a minor surgical 
procedure involving virtually no risk”); Creamer v. Georgia, 192 S.E.2d 350, 353 (Ga. 
1972) (concluding that “the removal of the bullet from the defendant’s body would 
amount to a minor intrusion into his person”); State v. Richards, 585 S.W.2d 505, 506 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979) (“There would [be] no danger to life, limb, tissue, muscle, or 
ligaments.”); State v. Avila, 910 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. App. 1994) (“[T]he threat, if 
any, to Avila’s health and safety was minimal.”); Allen, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (finding “that 
the bullet lodged superficially beneath Allen’s skin could be removed, without any harm 
or risk of life or injury, by minor surgery and under local anesthetic”). 
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involves.192  But the “risk, trauma, or pain” that attends antipsychotic 
medications can be just as great.  It is inconceivable that a court that has 
denied involuntary surgery because the defendant might suffer an 
infection or tissue damage would, given an equivalently important 
government interest, allow involuntary medications when the defendant 
might develop tardive dyskinesia or diabetes. 
B.  Measuring the Government’s Interest in Criminal Prosecutions 
Under Sell, courts must decide whether the government’s interest in 
rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is “important.”193  In some 
ways, this inquiry resembles the Fourth Amendment balancing of 
individual harms and government benefits.194  The difference, though, is 
that the Sell inquiry regarding the weight of the government’s interest is 
not one side of a test that directly compares harms and benefits but 
rather is, like “medical appropriateness,” a categorical or threshold test.  
Unlike the Fourth Amendment cases, courts do not ask whether the 
government’s interest is important enough to justify the harms of involuntary 
treatment.  Instead, courts ask simply whether the government’s interest 
meets some abstract or absolute measure of “important.” 
Courts have struggled to identify criteria that will allow them to 
classify the government’s interest in bringing defendants to trial as either 
“important” or “not important.”  One initial problem is that in some sense, 
the government’s interest in prosecuting every criminal charge against 
every defendant is important.195  On the other hand, though, Sell requires 
that courts consider the government’s interest in prosecuting some charges 
 
 192. E.g., Bowden, 510 S.W.2d at 881 (refusing to order removal of bullet because 
“[i]t is uncontroverted that the proposed operation constitutes medically a major 
intrusion into the petitioner’s body involving trauma, pain and possible risk of life even 
when performed in a proper medical environment with the most careful and skilled 
attention”); Allen, 291 S.E.2d at 463 (“I find that removal of the bullet from the 
defendant, Walter Childers, Jr., would require major surgery procedures involving a 
substantial intrusion into his body and risk to his health, safety or life.”); see also 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (setting forth “risk, trauma, or pain” 
as a factor influencing reasonableness of involuntary treatment). 
 193. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). 
 194. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761, 765 (1985) (including the 
government’s need for the evidence that might be obtained as a factor for courts to 
consider when assessing reasonableness); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (finding 
involuntary blood test did not violate Fourth Amendment in part because it was “highly 
effective” in identifying drunk drivers). 
 195. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“[T]he Government seeks to protect through 
application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.”); Riggins v. Nevada, 
504 U.S. 127, 135–36 (1992) (“Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is 
fundamental to a scheme of ‘ordered liberty’ and prerequisite to social justice and 
peace.” (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring))). 
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against some defendants to be important and its interest in prosecuting 
other charges against other defendants to be not important.196  Identifying 
which charges against which defendants are serious enough to make the 
government’s interest in prosecuting those charges “important,” and 
which are not, is a more complex task than at first it might seem.197 
One measure that many courts have used to assess the seriousness of 
criminal charges is the sentence that a defendant will receive if found 
guilty.  This approach has a certain logical simplicity: The greater the 
sentence, the more serious must be the charge.  But beneath this surface 
simplicity lies the not-at-all simple question whether to measure a 
defendant’s prospective sentence in terms of the statutory maximum or 
in terms of an expected guidelines range.  For example, in Archuleta the 
defendant was charged with providing false information—lying about a 
prior mental health commitment—in the acquisition of a firearm.198  The 
government argued that the charge was serious because the statutory 
maximum sentence was ten years.199  Archuleta argued that the relevant 
punishment was the expected sentence under the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual, which according to Archuleta was at most between 
twelve to sixteen months.200  Archuleta further argued that this expected 
sentence, combined with the fact that he had already been in custody 
almost that long, made the government’s interest in rendering him 
competent to stand trial not important.201  Most courts that look to 
sentencing to determine whether the government’s interest in rendering a 
defendant competent to stand trial is important conclude what the 
Archuleta court concluded, that the statutory maximum is the proper 
measure of the government’s interest,202 although some courts have 
ruled that an expected guidelines sentence is the proper measure.203 
 
 196. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (“[A] court must find that important governmental 
interests are at stake.”); id. at 179 (“[T]he Constitution permits the Government 
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious 
criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent to stand trial . . . .”). 
 197. For a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties involved in assessing the 
weight of the government’s interest in adjudicating different criminal charges, see 
generally Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and Constitutional Line-Drawing, 90 VA. L. 
REV. 1957 (2004). 
 198. United States v. Archuleta, 218 F. App’x 754, 755 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 199. Id. at 758. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 758–59. 
 202. Id. at 759; Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1114, 1126 (2008) (“Most courts have judged the importance of bringing a 
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Another yardstick that some courts have used to assess seriousness is 
how a legislature has designated the charges.  Not surprisingly, the 
government’s interest in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial is 
more likely to be found to be important when the charges against the 
defendant are “felonies,” while the interest in rendering competent to 
stand trial a defendant charged with “misdemeanors,” or with offenses 
that are otherwise not felonies, such as probation violations, is less likely 
to be important.204 
A few courts have rejected any bright-line rules for measuring the 
seriousness of criminal charges.  These courts’ inquiries, which are quite 
fact-intensive, come close to the kind of balancing test that asks whether 
the government’s interest in bringing a particular defendant to trial is 
important enough to justify the harms of involuntary treatment.205  In 
United States v. Lindauer, for example, Susan Lindauer—whom every 
mental health expert, government as well as defense, agreed experienced 
paranoid and grandiose delusions that made her incompetent to stand 
trial206—was charged with acting and conspiring to act as an unregistered 
 
defendant to trial based on the maximum penalty the defendant could face if 
convicted.”).  In these cases, courts often state that they are following the Supreme 
Court’s approach to determining seriousness when the question is whether the defendant 
has a right to a jury trial.  See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“In Duncan v. Louisiana . . . the Supreme Court observed that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to trial by jury exists only in ‘serious’ criminal cases . . . .  More 
recent right-to-jury cases have explicitly found that the primary measure of seriousness is 
‘the maximum penalty attached to the offense.’” (citations omitted)).  Other courts cite 
the objectivity of statutory maximums.  See, e.g., United States v. Green, 532 F.3d 538, 
549 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the maximum statutory penalty is the most objective 
means of determining the seriousness of a crime and the standard we adopt”). 
 203. E.g., United States v. Hernandez-Vasquez, 506 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(using the predicted guidelines sentence, rather than the statutory maximum, to measure 
seriousness); United States v. Thrasher, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1237 (W.D. Mo. 2007) 
(same); United States v. Schloming, No. 05-5017 (TJB), 2006 WL 1320078, at *6 (D. 
N.J. May 12, 2006) (“Had it been the Supreme Court’s intention to classify a charge as 
serious based on the maximum penalty, it could have done so.”). 
 204. E.g., Born v. Thompson, 117 P.3d 1098, 1102 (Wash. 2005) (“The government 
simply does not have the same interest in prosecuting misdemeanant defendants as it 
does in prosecuting defendants charged with felonies.”); United States v. Kourey, 276 F. 
Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W.Va. 2003) (“Defendant is not facing serious criminal charges 
upon which he will be tried.  Rather, Defendant is charged with violating the terms and 
conditions of his supervised release imposed for his admitted commission of a Class A 
misdemeanor.”).  But see United States v. Everage, No. 05–11–DLB, 2006 WL 1007274, 
at *1 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 17, 2006) (“Although Defendant is charged with two misdemeanors, 
they both allegedly involve threats to others, one with a firearm.  The Court therefore 
concludes Defendant is charged with serious crimes.”). 
 205. Although most courts do not undertake it, the fact-intensive inquiry is what 
Sell mandates: Courts “must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the 
Government’s interest in prosecution.”  539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). 
 206. United States v. Lindauer, 448 F. Supp. 2d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“At 
least a half dozen mental health professionals, including a psychologist and a psychiatrist 
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agent of the foreign country of Iraq.207  Rather than consult any objective 
measure, such as the statutory maximum sentences or the legislature’s 
classifications of the charges, the court considered the improbability that 
Lindauer’s actions could have caused any real harm.  The court observed 
that Lindauer “could not act successfully as an agent of the Iraqi 
government without in some way influencing normal people . . . and the 
record shows that even lay people recognize that she is seriously 
disturbed.”208  Similarly, in United States v. Dumeny, the court decided 
that despite being charged with an offense that carried a ten-year 
statutory maximum sentence, Jason Dumeny could not be administered 
involuntary medications because the one charge against him—
possession of a firearm by a person previously committed to mental 
health treatment—did not involve any violence.209 
Many cases are like Dumeny, cases in which the seriousness of the 
charges against the defendant is debatable.  These are the cases in which 
a balancing test could make the most difference in protecting the 
defendant’s interest in avoiding unreasonable harms: If the importance 
of the government’s interest is unclear, then a high risk of side effects, or 
even a low risk of more serious side effects, should cause a court to rule 
that involuntary antipsychotics are not justified, while a low risk of 
minor side effects would support a decision allowing involuntary 
antipsychotics. 
In some cases, though, the charges against the defendant are 
 
retained by the defense, and several psychologists and psychiatrists employed, and one 
psychiatrist retained, by the government, have found her mentally incompetent to stand 
trial . . . .”). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 571; see also id. at 571–72 (“[T]here is no indication that Lindauer ever 
came close to influencing anyone, or could have.  The indictment charges only what it 
describes as an unsuccessful attempt to influence an unnamed government 
official . . . .”). 
 209. 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132–33 (D. Me. 2004).  The court reasoned that: 
Mr. Dumeny is currently charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) with possession 
of firearms by a person previously committed to a mental health institute.  
Without diminishing the potential seriousness of this charge, which carries 
significant potential penalties, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), it is noteworthy that 
Mr. Dumeny has been charged with possession only.  He has not been charged 
with improper use of the firearms.  Although the Forensic Evaluation Report 
makes reference to Mr. Dumeny’s violent proclivities, the only criminal charge 
before the court at this time is the possession charge.  This court concludes in 
view of the pending charge, the government interest at stake is insufficient for 
this court to mandate intrusive involuntary treatment of Mr. Dumeny. 
Id. 
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unquestionably very serious.  Russell Weston, for example, was charged 
with two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder after he 
opened fire in the U.S. Capitol building, killing two guards and 
wounding a third.210  In Weston, one of the district court’s opinions 
stated that “if a compelling case ever existed . . . that would justify 
forcibly medicating the defendant solely to become competent to stand 
trial, this case clearly meets that standard,”211 while the D.C. Circuit 
wrote that “[t]he government’s interest in finding, convicting, and 
punishing criminals reaches its zenith when the crime is the murder of 
federal police officers.”212 
When the charges against an incompetent defendant are clearly very 
serious, the government’s interest in rendering the defendant competent 
to stand trial will likely be important enough to justify the harms of 
involuntary antipsychotic medications.  But even in cases involving charges 
that are clearly very serious, some “special circumstances” might 
diminish the government’s interest in bringing a particular defendant to 
trial.213  For example, when a defendant is charged with committing 
especially serious crimes, like Weston, the government’s interest in 
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial will sometimes be 
diminished, at least to some extent, by the ability to detain under civil 
commitment statutes defendants who are both mentally ill and 
 
 210. United States v. Weston, 134 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d, 255 F.3d 
873 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1067 (2001); United States v. Weston, 69 F. 
Supp. 2d 99 (D.D.C. 1999), rev’d, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000).  Russell Weston, forty-
three years old with a long history of mental illness, believed that the world was 
threatened by “Black Heva,” a deadly plague that Weston could stop by accessing a 
secret time machine located in the “great safe of the U.S. Senate.”  Weston further 
believed, according to the report of a prison psychiatrist who evaluated him, that: 
While “working for NASA” in the early 1980’s, he developed a “Ruby 
Satellite System,” a powerful reverse time machine that enables users to “push 
time in reverse . . . by passing us through the Jurassic Sea, putting us into 
another time frame.”  For those like Weston with access to the “Ruby Satellite 
System,” nothing is permanent—the user can simply reverse time.  If 
convicted and executed, Weston will “simply be time reversed, put into a safe 
in the Capitol, and be able to resume his life at whatever point he chooses.” 
United States v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Tatel, J., concurring). 
The Weston cases were decided before Sell, but like Sell they relied on Harper and 
Riggins.  See, e.g., Weston, 255 F.3d at 876 (“In Washington v. Harper and later in 
Riggins v. Nevada, the Supreme Court recognized that the government may, under 
certain circumstances, forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a prisoner or 
criminal defendant despite his liberty interest, provided such medication is ‘medically 
appropriate.’”); Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 105–06 (discussing Harper and Riggins). 
 211. Weston, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
 212. Weston, 255 F.3d at 881. 
 213. The Sell Court referred to factors that might diminish the government’s interest 
in bringing a defendant to trial as “[s]pecial circumstances.”  Sell v. United States, 539 
U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (“Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest 
[in prosecution].”). 
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dangerous—like Weston.214  Perhaps ironically, one outcome for the 
defendant might well be the same—involuntary antipsychotic medications— 
whether a court allows such medications for the purpose of diminishing 
the defendant’s dangerousness or for the purpose of rendering him 
competent to stand trial.  Still, there might be some advantages to 
pursuing civil commitment rather than a criminal trial.  In some cases, 
civil commitment might be more likely than criminal prosecution to 
promote effective long-term treatment of the defendant’s mental illness, 
a result that would benefit both the defendant and the government.215  
For example, civil commitment might be more likely to keep the defendant 
in the community, to include psychosocial therapies in addition to 
antipsychotic medications, and to foster a therapeutic relationship between 
 
 214. Id. (“The defendant’s failure to take drugs voluntarily . . . may mean lengthy 
confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that 
ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious 
crime.”).  Indeed, when the court ruled that continued involuntary medication was not 
likely to render Weston competent to stand trial, Weston was committed under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 4246, which allows for the civil commitment of someone previously detained as 
incompetent to stand trial if that person “is presently suffering from a mental disease or 
defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another person or serious damage to property of another.”  18 U.S.C.S. § 4246 
(LexisNexis 2008); see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 4241 (LexisNexis 2008) (“If, at the end of the 
time period specified, it is determined that the defendant’s mental condition has not so 
improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant is subject to the 
provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.”); United States v. Weston, No. 98–357 (EGS), 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23579, at *2–6 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2004). 
 215. Effective long-term treatment of those defendants whose criminal acts were 
committed while they were actively mentally ill—Weston again, for example—promotes 
the criminal justice goal of deterring future criminal acts.  Of course, civil commitment 
cannot satisfy all of the goals of the criminal justice system.  See United States v. 
Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“The civil commitment argument . . . 
ignores the retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative functions of the 
criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that offenders receive their just deserts, to 
make clear that offenses entail consequences, and to discover what happened through the 
public mechanism of trial.”); see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 186, at 230 (agreeing with 
the Weston court that civil commitment is an inadequate substitute for criminal 
prosecution).  But not even criminal prosecutions usually satisfy all of the goals of the 
criminal justice system.  Plea bargains, for example, are a common compromise between 
prosecutors, who offer lesser sentences, and criminal defendants, who in exchange for 
these lesser sentences give up their rights to a fair trial.  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea 
Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992) (referring to prosecutors 
“purchasing procedural entitlements with lower sentences”); Ronald Wright & Marc 
Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (2003) 
(“Extremely low trial rates, perhaps in conjunction with low acquittal rates, may 
indirectly suggest the presence of an excessive trial penalty, and the diminution of justice 
that comes with it.”). 
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the defendant and his treatment providers.  Involuntary medications 
administered for the purpose of diminishing a defendant’s dangerousness 
are of course involuntary, but involuntary medications administered for 
the purpose of rendering a defendant competent to stand trial are not 
only involuntary but also adversarial.  Administering antipsychotic 
medications that are both involuntary and adversarial will perhaps make 
the defendant’s experience doubly aversive and will perhaps thereby 
diminish the chances that he will respond favorably to the involuntary 
treatment and will then choose to continue to receive treatment voluntarily 
once the conditions that justify the involuntary treatment have ended. 
An additional consideration that might diminish the government’s 
interest is that even when administering involuntary medications succeeds 
in rendering a defendant competent to stand trial, the government’s 
interest that has been advanced is the interest in prosecuting the charges 
against only that one particular defendant.  In contrast, in some cases, 
such as Schmerber, an involuntary medical procedure, such as a blood 
test, advances a broader government interest, such as the interest in 
administering the whole system of drunk driving laws.216  The inability to 
bring to trial any single, individual defendant does not threaten the whole 
system of criminal prosecutions.217  Thus, even when the charges against an 
incompetent defendant are undeniably serious, the government’s interest 
in bringing the defendant to trial might not always be important enough 
to justify the harms of involuntary antipsychotic medications. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Under the due process test that the Supreme Court developed in 
Harper, Riggins, and Sell, trial courts routinely permit the government to 
administer involuntary antipsychotic medications to incompetent criminal 
defendants because such medications are “medically appropriate” for 
defendants diagnosed with schizophrenia and because the government’s 
interest in prosecuting criminal charges is “important.”218  But these 
 
 216. See supra note 93. 
 217. See Michael K. Gottlieb, Executions and Torture: The Consequences of 
Overriding Professional Ethics, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 351, 373 (2006) 
(“It is not the criminal justice system, en toto, that is being obstructed or impeded.  
Rather it is the prescribed justice in a particular case in which a certain punishment . . . is 
undeliverable.”); Michael G. Rogers, Bodily Intrusion in Search of Evidence: A Study in 
Fourth Amendment Decisionmaking, 62 IND. L.J. 1181, 1199 (1987) (“The blood 
tests . . . served a substantial public interest in deterring drunk driving.  The blood tests 
also provided reliable scientific evidence that would be more useful in court than 
alternative evidence . . . .  Bullet-retrieval surgery, however, serves no public interest 
beyond bringing a particular criminal to justice.” (footnote omitted)). 
 218. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180–81 (2003); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 
U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226–27 (1990). 
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separate categorical or threshold standards fail to adequately protect 
incompetent criminal defendants from harms that are not justified by the 
government’s interest in bringing them to trial.  A test like the Fourth 
Amendment’s balancing test, which would require courts to weigh the 
defendant’s interest in avoiding the harms of involuntary antipsychotic 
medications directly against the government’s interest in rendering the 
defendant competent to stand trial, would better ensure that incompetent 
criminal defendants are not subject to harms that are unreasonable. 
 
